
# The original documents are located in Box 26, folder "State Department - Kissinger Speeches and Statements (3)" of the Ron Nessen Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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LIMIYED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 01 OF 12 SECTO17050 EXDIS E.D. 11652: GDS TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A) SUBJ: TEXT OF SECRETARY'S BUCHAN LECTURE FOR S/PRS, M AND H DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR SCONCROFT

I. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF THE INAUGURAL ALASTAIR BUCHAN MEMONIAL LECTURE TO BE DELIVERED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER IN LONDON AT 6 P.N. FRIDAY, JUNE 25 AT INVITATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES. TEXT SHOULD BE MARKED "AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY" AND EM-BARGUED FOR 1 P.N. EDT JUNE 25. BEGIN TEXT:

2. LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, FRIENDS: ON MY ARRIVAL IN WASHINGTON SEVER YEARS AGO, ONE OF MY FIRST ACTS WAS TO GATHER A GROUP OF SENIOR SCHOLARS OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS TO MAVE THEM GIVE THEIR ADVICE TO A NEW PRESIDENT ON REM LATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES, THE CHAIRMAN OF THAT GROUP WAS ALASTAIR BUCHAN.

3. HE SHOULD NOT BEHELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RESULTS. BUT IT WAS ONLY MATURAL TO SEEK HIS COUNSEL. FOR ALASYAIR WAS MORE THAN A DISTINGUISHED EXPERT; HE WAS A CONSUMMATE MAN OF THE WEST. A SCOT BY BIRTH, HE CON-SIDERED HIMSELF, AND REFERRED TO HIMSELF, AS A EUROPEAN. HE LIVED WANY YEARS IN THE UNITED STATES AND VISITED US OFTEN, APPLYING HIS INCISIVE MIND TO THE STUDY OF AMERICA AND ITS HOLE IN THE WORLD. HE WAS A CHAMPION OF THE IMPORTANCE, INDEED THE INEVITABILITY, OF THE TRANS-ATLANTIC TIE BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE.

4. BENEATH THE SKEPTICAL AIR WAS A PASSIONATE COMMIT-

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NENT TO THE VALUES AND TRADITIONS WE CHERISH AS WESTERN CIVILIZATION, SIR PETER RAMSBOTHAM SATO IN HIS EULOGY OF ALASTAIR IN WASHINGTON THAT NO OTHER COUNTRYNAN OF HIS HAD CONTRIBUTED MORE TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF THTER-NATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE LATTER HALF OF THE THENTIETH CENTURY. BUT ALASTAIR'S FOCUS WAS NOT SIMPLY THE STRUCTURE OF GLOBAL POLITICS AND THE ROOTS OF WAR: IT WAS THE CENTRAL ROLE OF THE WEST IN PRESERVING PEACE AND GIVING IT MORAL PURPOSE.

5. THIS INSTITUTE IS A MONUMENT TO HIS QUEST.

6. ALASTAIR HAD THAT CONDINATION OF INTELLECT AND CON-PASSION KNOWN AS WISDOM. IT MOTIVATED THE GREAT CON-YRIBUTION HE MADE TO SCHOLARSHIP AND TO A GENERATION'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS. HE HAS LEFT HIS MARK ON EVERY PERSON IN THIS HALL. DURING THE LAST SEVEN YEARS, HE NEVER HESIYATED TO SCOLD HE IN ALL FRIENDSHIP WHEN HE THOUGHT THAT AMERICAN POLICY DID NOT DO JUSTICE TO THE GREAT CAUSE OF EUROPEAN MANERICAN COOPERATION. I HOULD LIKE TO THINK THAT, MAD HE LIVED, HE MOULD FEEL THAT, AFTER MANY STARTS, HE HAVE MADE GREAT STRIDES IN STRENGTHENING THE UNITY OF THE WEST, AND IF THAT WERE HIS CONVICTION, I FOR ONE WOULD BE VERY PROUD.

7 . "STRUCTURAL CHANGES," ALASTAIR MROTE, "ARE OCCURRING IN THE RELATIVE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF THE MAJOR STATES; THERE HAS BEEN A QUANTITATIVE CHANGE OF COLOSSAL PRO-PORTIONS IN THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF WESTERN SOCIETIES AND IN THE DEMANDS WE MAKE ON NATURAL RESOURCES; AND THERE ARE BUALITATIVE CHANGES IN THE PREDCCUPATIONS OF OUR SOCIETIES." HE THEN POSED THE QUESTION: "CAN THE HIGHLY INDUSTRIALIZED STATES SUSTAIN OR RECOVER A GUALITY IN THEIR NATIONAL LIFE WHICH NOT ONLY SATISFIES THE NEW GENERATION, BUT CAN ACT AS AN EXAMPLE OR ATTRACTIVE FORCE TO OTHER SOCIETIES?"

8. ALL OF US WHO WISH TO HONOR ALASTAIR'S MENORY MUST DO SU IN THE WAY HE WOULD WANT MOST OF BY PROVING THAT THE ANSWER TO HIS QUESTION IS YES. A MORLO THAT CRIES OUT FOR ECONOMIC ADVANCE, FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE.

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FOR POLITICAL LIBERTY AND FOR A STABLE PEACE NEEDS D/UR COLLECTIVE COMMITMENT AND CONTRIBUTION. I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES WORKING TOGETHER HAVE THE MEANS, IF THEY HAVE THE WILL, TO SHAPE CREATIVELY A NEW ERA OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, INDEED WE ARE DOING SO ON MANY FRONTS TODAY, THANKS NO LITTLE TO THE CLARITY ALASTAIR BROUGHT TO OUR PURPOSES AND DIRECTIONS.

9. A GENERATION AGD, WESTERN STATESMEN FASHIONED NEW INSTITUTIONS OF COLLABORATION TO STAVE OFF A COMMON THREAT. OUR PROGRESS AFTER THIRTY YEARS HAS BEEN STRIKING. GLOBAL WAR HAS BEEN DETERRED AND ALL OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES LIVE WITH AN ENHANCED SENSE OF SECURITY, OUR ECONOMIES ARE THE MOST PROSPEROUS ON EARTH: OUR TECHNOLOGY, AND PRODUCTIVE GENIUS HAVE PROVEN INDISPENSABLE FOR ALL COUNTRIES SEEKING TO BETTER THE WELFARE OF THEIR PEOPLES, BE THEY SOCIALIST OR DEVELOP-ING. OUR SOCIETIES REPRESENT, MORE THAN EVER, A BEACON OF HOPE TO THOSE WHO YEARN FOR LIBERTY AND JUSTICE AND PROGRESS. IN NO PART OF THE WORLD AND UNDER NO OTHER SYSTEM DO MEN LIVE SO WELL AND IN SO MUCH FREEDOM. IF PERFORMANCE IS ANY CRITERION, THE CONTEST BETWEEN FREE-DOM AND COMMUNISM, OF WHICH SO MUCH WAS MADE THREE DECADES AGO, HAS BEEN WON BY THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES.

10. AND YET AT THIS PRECISE NOMENT WE HEAR IN OUR COUNTRIES PREMONITIONS OF DECLINE, ANXIETIES ABOUT THE TRAVAIL OF THE WEST AND THE ADVANCE OF AUTHORITARIANISM. CAN IT BE THAT OUR DEEPER PROBLEMS ARE NOT OF RESOURCES BUT OF WILL, NOT OF POWER BUT OF CONCEPTION?

11. HE WHO OVERCAME GREAT DANGERS THIRTY YEARS AGO MUST

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NOT NOW PARALYZE GURSELVES WITH ILLUSIONS OF IMPOTENCE. WE HAVE ALREADY INITIATED THE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THIS TIME ON A GLOBAL SCALE; WE MUST SUMMON THE DETERMINATION TO WORK TOWARDS IT IN UNITY AND MUTUAL CONFIDENCE.

12. FOR AMERICA, COOPERATION AMONG THE FREE NATIONS IS A MORAL, AND NOT MERELY A PRACTICAL, NECESSITY, AMERICANS HAVE NEVER BEEN COMEORTABLE WITH CALCULATIONS OF INTEREST AND POWER ALONE, AMERICA, TO BE ITSELF, NEEDS A SENSE OF IDENTITY AND COLLABORATION WITH OTHER NATIONS WHO SHARE ITS VALUES.

13. OUR ASSOCIATION WITH WESTERN EUROPE, CANADA, AND JAPAN THUS GOES TO THE HEART OF OUR NATIONAL FUR\* POSE. COMMON ENDEAVORS WITH OUR SISTER DEMOCRACIES RAISE THE GOALS OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY BEYOND PHYSICAL SURVIVAL, TOWARDS A PEACE OF HUMAN PROGRESS AND DIGNITY, THE TIES OF INTELLECTUAL CIVILIZATION, DEMOCRATIC TRADITION, MISTORICAL ASSOCIATION, AND MORE THAN A GEN\* ERATION OF COMMON ENDEAVOR BIND US TOGETHER MORE FIRMLY THAN COULD ANY PRAGMATIC CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL INTEREST ALONE. THE UNITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES HAS BEEN THE CORNERSTONE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FOR THIRTY YEARS\*\*AND IT WILL REMAIN SO FOR AS FAR AHEAD AS WE CAN SEE.

14. SO I WOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO ALASTAIR THIS EVENING BY ADDRESSING THE ISSUES HE RAISED: CAN AMERICA, EUROPE, AND THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES MEET THE CHALLENGE OF THE WORLO'S FUTURE? WHAT IS THE STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP?

15. THE UNITED STATES AND A UNITED EUROPE: IN 1973, WITH VIETNAM AT LAST BEMIND US, AND FRESH FROM NEW INITIATIVES WITH CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES PRO= POSED THAT THE COLLABORATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOC= RACIES BE GIVEN NEW IMPETUS, MILITARY SECURITY, WHILE STILL CRUCIAL, WAS NO LONGER SUFFICIENT TO GIVE CONTENT OR POLITICAL COMESION TO OUR BROADER RELATIONSHIP, OR TO RETAIN SUPPORT FOR IT FROM A NEW GENERATION, WE FACED IMPORTANT EAST=NEST NEGOTIATIONS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FORCE REDUCTIONS; A FRESH AGENDA OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS; THE CHALLENGE OF SHAPING ANEW OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEVELOPING WORLD: AND THE NEED TO REDEFINE RELATIONS BETWEEN AMERICA AND A STRENGTMENED AND ENLARGED EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.

16. IT IS ACADEMIC TO DEBATE NOW WHETHER THE UNITED

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STATES ACTED TOO THEORETICALLY IN PROPOSING TO APPROACH THESE CHALLENGES THROUGH THE ELABORATION OF A NEW ATLANTIC DECLARATION, OR WHETHER OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS

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ACTED WISELY IN TREATING THIS PROPOSAL AS A TEST CASE OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY, THE DOCTRINAL ARGUMENTS OF 1973 OVER THE PROCEDURE FOR ATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS, OR WHETHER EUROPE WAS EXERCISING ITS PROPER GLOBAL ROLE, OR WHETHER ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES SHOULD BE LINKED, HAVE IN FACT BEEN SETTLED BY THE PRACTICE OF CONSULTATIONS AND COOPERATION UNPRECEDENTED IN INTENSITY AND SCOPE. THE REALITY AND SUCCESS OF OUR COMMON ENDEAVORS HAVE PRO-VIDED THE BEST DEFINITION AND REVITALIZATION OF DUR RELATIONSHIP.

17. THERE IS NO LONGER ANY QUESTION THAT EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES MUST COOPERATE CLOSELY, UNDER WHATEVER LABEL, AND THAT THE UNITY OF EUROPE IS ESSENTIAL TO THAT PROCESS.

18. IN ITS EARLY DAYS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY WAS THE FOCUS OF MUCH AMERICAN IDEALISM, AND PERHAPS OF SOME PATERNALISM, AS WE URGED MODELS OF FEDERAL UNITY AND TRANSATLANTIC BURDEN-SHARING ON OUR EUROPEAN FRIENDS. BY NOW, LEADERS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC HAVE COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT EUROPEAN UNITY CANNOT BE BUILT BY AMERICANS OR TO AN AMERICAN PRESCRIPTION; IT MUST RES/ULT FROM EUROPEAN INITIATIVES.

19. THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION=BOTH ITS SUCCESSES AND ITS SETBACKS=INEVITABLY GIVES RISE TO NEW QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER THE UNITED STATES STILL WELCOMES EUROPEAN UNIFICATION. LET ME TAKE THIS OCCASION TO EMPMASIZE OUR CONVICTION THAT EUROPEAN UNITY IS CRUCIAL FOR EUROPE, FOR THE WEST, AND FOR THE WORLD. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGE IT.

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20. HE HAVE PERHAPS BECOME A LITTLE MORE SOPHISTICATED ABOUT OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROCESS. WE NO LONGER EXPECT THAT IT WILL GROW FROM THE DESIRE TO EASE AMERICAN BURDENS. IF EUROPE IS TO CARRY A PART OF THE WEST'S RESPONSIBILITIES INTHE WORLD. IT MUST DO SO ACCONDING TO ITS OWN CONCEPTIONS AND IN ITS OWN INTEREST. ALASTAIR BUCHAN MROTE: "IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO INSPIRE WESTERN EUROPE TO POLITICAL UNITY OF TO ENCOURAGE JAPANESE SELF-RELIANCE UNLESS THEY HAVE THE FREEDOM AND CONFIDENCE TO DEFINE THEIR INTERESTS IN EVERY SPHERE, INTERESTS WHICH MUST BE RECONCILED WITH THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES BUT NOT SUBORDINATED TO THEM."

21. THE UNITED STATES ENDORSES THIS PRINCIPLE WHOLE. HEARTEOLY. IT IS NOT HEALTHY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO BE THE DNLY CENTER OF INITIATIVE AND LEADERSHIP IN THE DEMOCRATIC WORLD. IT IS NOT HEALTHY FOR EUROPE TO BE ONLY & PASSIVE PARTICIPANT, HOWEVER CLOSE THE FRIENDSHIP AND MOMEVER INTIMATE THE CONSULTATION.

22. ME THEREFORE WELCOME THE FACT THAT EUROPEIS ROLE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS IS GAINING IN VIGOR AND EFFECTIVENESS. A VIYAL AND COMESIVE WESTERN EUROPE IS AN IRREPLACEABLE WEIGHT ON THE SCALES OF GLOBAL DIPLOMACY; AMERICAN POLICY CAN ONLY GAIN BY MAVING A STRONG PARTNER OF PARALLEL MORAL PURPOSES.

23. OF COURSE, WE DO NOT WANT EUROPE TO FIND ITS IDENTITY IN OPPOSITION TO THE UNITED STATES. BUT NEITHER DOES ANY SENSIBLE EUROPEAN. OF COURSE, THERE WILL BE DISAGREEMENTS BETHEEN US OF TACTICS, AND SOMETIMES OF PERSPECTIVES, IF NOT OF ENDS. BUT I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT AMERICANS HAVE SO LOST CONFIDENCE IN OURSELVES THAT WE MUST INHISIT THE ROLE OF OTHERS, WITH WHOM WE MAY HAVE OCCASIONAL DIFFERENCES, BUT WHO SHARE OUR HIGHEST VALUES. THE WISEST STATESMEN ON THE TWO SIDES OF THE OCEAN MAVE ALWAYS KNOWN THAT EUROPEAN UNITY AND ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP ARE BOTH ESSENTIAL AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING.

24. SO LET US FINALLY PUT BEHIND US THE DESATES OVER WHETHER EUROPE'S UNITY HAS AMERICAN SUPPORT. WE CONSIDER THE ISSUE SETTLED. LET /US RATHER ADDRESS DURSELVES TO THE URGENT CHALLENGES OF MUTUAL CONCERN WHICH A UNITING EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND ALL INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES MUST FACE TOGETHER ... COMMON DEFENSE, EAST\* MEST RELATIONS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY.

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25. THE SECURITY OF THE DEMOCRACIES

SECURITY IS THE BEDROCK OF ALL THAT WE DO. A QUAR= TER CENTURY AGO, THE AMERICAN DEFENSE COMMITMENT TO EUROPE PROVIDED THE SHIELD BEHIND WHICH WESTERN EUROPE RECOVERED ITS ECONOMIC HEALTH AND POLITICAL VITALITY. TODAY, OUR COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE DEFENSE - AND THE US= JAPANESE RELATIONSHIP - CONTINUE TO BE ESSENTIAL FOR GLOBAL STABILITY. BUT THE NATURE OF SECURITY AND STRATE= GY HAS FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGED SINCE THE TIME WHEN OUR ALLIANCES WERE FOUNDED:

--THE SOVIET UNION HAS RECOVERED FROM THE DEVASTA-TION OF WORLD WAR II AND PRESSED VIGOROUSLY AHEAD ON THE PATH OF INCUSTRIAL GROWTH. POSSESSING RE-SOURCES ON A CONTINENTAL SCALE, AND IMPOSING ON ITS PEOPLE ENORMOUS SACRIFICES IN THE NAME OF ITS IDEOLOGY, THE USSR HAS DEVELOPED ITS ECONOMIC STRENGTH AND TECHNOLOGY TO A POINT WHERE IT CAN MATCH THE WEST IN MANY SECTORS OF INDUSTRIAL AND MILITARY POWER. IT SHOWS NO SIGNS OF CHANGING ITS PRIORITIES.

---FOR CENTURIES IT WAS AXIOMATIC THAT INCREASES IN MILITARY POWER COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO ALMOST IMMEDIATE POLITICAL ADVANTAGE. IT IS NOW CLEAR THAT IN STRATEGIC WEAPONRY NEW INCREMENTS OF WEAPONS OR DESTRUCTIVENESS DO NOT AUTOMATICALLY LEAD TO EITHER MILITARY OR POLITICAL GAINS. THE DESTRUCTIVENESS OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS HAS CONTRI-BUTED TO THE EMERGENCE OF NUCLEAR STALEMATE. NEITHER SIDE, IF IT ACTS WITH MINIMUM PRUDENCE, WILL LET THE BALANCE TIP AGAINST IT, EITHER IN AN ARMS RACE OR IN AN AGREEMENT TO LIMIT ARMS.

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--BENEATH THE NUCLEAR UMBRELLA, THE TEMPTATION TO PROBE WITH REGIONAL FORCES OR PROXY WARS INCREASES, THE STEADY GROWTH OF SOVIET CONVEN-TIONAL MILITARY AND NAVAL POWER AND ITS EXPAND-ING GLOBAL REACH CANNOT BE IGNORED, CONVENTION-AL FORCES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ALLIES ASSUME PIVOTAL IMPORTANCE. WE MUST ENSURE THAT THE STRENGTH AND FLEXIBILITY OF ALL FORCES CAPABLE OF LOCAL DEFENSE ARE ENHANCED. AND WE MUST CONDUCT A PRUDENT AND FORCEFUL FOREIGN POLICY THAT IS PREPARED TO USE OUR STRENGTH TO BLOCK EXPANSIONISM.

26. THESE NEW REALITIES DEMAND FROM US STEADINESS ABOVE ALL. DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES MAVE ALWAYS FLUCTUATED IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS DEFENSE --- BETWEEN COMPLACENCY AND ALARMIST CONCERN. THE LONG LEAD-TIMES OF MODERN WEAPONS AND THEIR COMPLEXITY MAKE BOTH THESE ABERRATIONS DANGER-OUS. ME CANNOT AFFORD ALTERNATION BETWEEN NEGLECT AND BURSTS OF FRENZY IF WE ARE TO MAVE A COHERENT DEFENSE PROGRAM AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE NECESSARY EXERTIONS. WE NEED AN ALLIED DEFENSE POSTURE THAT IS RELEVANT TO OUR DANGERS, CREDIBLE TO BOTH FRIENDS AND ADVERSARIES, AND JUSTIFIABLE TO OUR PEOPLES. AND WE MUST BE PREPARED TO SUSTAIN IT OVER THE LONG TERM.

27. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT WE MAINTAIN THE PROGRAMS THAT INSURE THAT THE BALANCE IS PRESERVED. BUT WE DWE IT TO OURSELVES TO SEE THE MILITARY BALANCE IN PROPER PERSPEC. TIVE. COMPLACENCY MAY PRODUCE WEAKNESS BUT EXAGGERATION OF DANGER CAN LEAD TO A LOSS OF WILL. TO BE SURE THERE HAS BEEN A STEADY BUILDUP OF SOVIET MILITARY DOWER. BUT WE HAVE ALSO SEEN TO THE STEADY GROWTH AND IMPROVE. MENT OF OUR OWN FORCES OVER THE SAME CERIOD.

WE HAVE ALWAYS HAD TO FACE SOVIET GROUND FORCES LARGER THAN OUR OWN --- PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S DEFINITION OF ITS NEEDS AS A POWER IN THE HEART OF THE EURASIAN LANDMASS. WITH PERCEIVED THREATS ON BOTH FLANKS, ITS NAVAL ODHER, WHILE A GROWING AND SERIOUS PROBLEM, IS FAR WEAKER THAN COMBINED ALLIEDAVAL STRENGTH IN TERMS OF TONNAGE, FIREPOW/ER, RANGE, ACCESS TO THE SEA. EXDERIENCE AND SEAMANSUIP. --- THE UNITED STATES, FOR ITS PART, IS EXPANDING

ITS ARMY FROM 13 TO 18 DIVISIONS THROUGH NEW MEASURES OF STREAMLINING FORCES; WE ARE INCREAS. ING OUR COMBAT FORCES IN EUROPE; WE PLAN TO STATION A NEW ARMY BRIGADE ON THE CRITICAL SEC. TOR OF THE NORTH GERMAN PLAIN; WE ARE AUGMENTING

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DUR NAVAL FORCES, DUR EUROPEAN ALLIES UAVE COM-PLETED MAJOR PROGRAMS TO BLILD COMMON INFRA-STRUCTURE: WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN NEW JOINT EFFORTS OF STANDARDIZATION AND

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INTEROPERABILITY OF ALLIED FORCES. ...UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FORCES ARE SUPERIOR IN ACCURACY, DIVERSITY, RELIABILITY, SURVIVABILITY, AND NUMBERS OF SEPARATELY TARGETABLE NUCLEAR WAR. MEADS, WE HAVE A COMMANDING LEAD IN STRATEGIC BOMBERS, IN ADDITION, THERE ARE AMERICAN DEPLOY. MENTS OVERSEAS AND THE NUCLEAR FORCES OF TWO ATLANTIC ALLIES.

---EVEN WITH DUR DIFFERENT PRIORITIES, THE ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL BASE WHICH UNDERLIES WESTERN MILITARY STRENGTH REMAINS OVERWHELMINGLY SUPERIOR IN SIZE AND CAPACITY FOR INNOVATION. THE SOVIET UNION SUFFERS ENDEMIC WEAKNESS IN ITS INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE: RECENT STUDIES INDICATE THAT THIS CHRONIC INEFFICIENCY EXTENDS EVEN INTO THEIR MILITARY SECTOR TO A MUCH GREATER EXTENT THAN REALIZED BEFORE.

28. THESE STRENGTHS OF OURS DEMONSTRATE THAT OUR PRESENT SECURITY POSTURE IS ADEQUATE, AND THAT IT IS WELL WITH-IN OUR CAPACITIES TO CONTINUE TO BALANCE THE VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF SOVIET POWER. TO MAINTAIN THE NECESSARY DEFENSE IS A QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP MORE THAN OF POWER. OUR SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY IS BOTH MANAGEABLE AND UNENO-ING. WE MUST UNDERTAKE SIGNIFICANT ADDITIONAL EFFORTS FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. FOR AS FAR AMEAD AS WE CAN SEE, WE WILL LIVE IN A TWILIGHT AREA BETWEEN TRANQUILITY AND OPEN CONFRONTATION.

29. THIS IS A TASK FOR BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC. OUR DEFENSE EFFORT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE WILL BE IMPORTANTLY AFFECTED BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS

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CONVINCED THAT DUR ALLIES SMARE SIMILAR PERCEPTIONS OF THE MILITARY CHALLENGE AND A COMPARABLE DETERMINATION TO MEET IT. THE GREATEST THREAT TO THE ALLIANCE WOULD OCCUR IF, FOR WHATEVER REASON -- THROUGH MISREADING THE THREAT, OR INATTENTION TO CONVENTIONAL FORCES, OR REDUC-TIONS OF THE DEFENSE EFFORTS OF ALLIES, OR DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS HITHIN NATO MEMBERS -- US PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NATO WERE MEAKENED.

30. THE CHALLENGE OF BUILDING SUFFICIENT HARDWARE IS EASIER THAN THOSE OF GEOPOLITICAL UNDERSTANDING, POLITI» CAL COORDINATION, AND ABOVE ALL RESOLVE. IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, ONCE A CHANGE IN THE GEOPOLITICAL BALANCE HAS BE COME UNAMBIGUOUS, IT IS TOO LATE TO OO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. MONEVER GREAT OUR STRENGTH, IT WILL PROVE EMPTY IF WE DO NOT RESIST BEEMINGLY MARGINAL CHANGES WHOSE CUMULATIVE IMPACT CAN UNDERMINE OUR SECURITY. POWER SERVES LITTLE PURPOSE WITHOUT THE OOCTRINES AND CONCEPTS WHICH DEFINE WHERE OUR INTERESTS REQUIRE ITS APPLICATION.

31. THEREFORE, LET US NOT PARALYZE OURSELVES BY A RHETORIC OF HEAKNESS, LET US CONCENTRATE ON BUILDING THE UNDERSTANDING OF OUR STRATEGIC INTERESTS WHICH MUST UNDER= LY ANY POLICY, THE FACT IS THAT NORHERE HAS THE WEST BEEN DEFEATED FOR LACK OF STRENGTH, OUR SETBACKS HAVE BEEN SELF=INFLICTED, EITHER BECAUSE LEADERS CHOSE OBJEC= TIVES THAT WERE BEYOND OUR PSYCHOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES OR BECAUSE OUR LEGISLATURES REFUSED TO SUPPORT WHAT THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH BELIEVED WAS ESSENTIAL, THIS == AND NOT THE VARIOUS "GAPS" THAT APPEAR IN THE AMERICAN DEBATE IN YEARS DIVISIBLE BY FOUR == IS THE DEEPEST SECURITY PROBLEM WE FACE.

32. EAST=WEST RELATIONS: AS LONG AGO AS THE HARMEL REPORT OF DECEMBER, 1967. THE ATLANTIC ALLLIANCE HAS TREATED AS ITS "THO MAIN FUNCTIONS" THE ASSURANCE OF MILITARY SECURITY AND REALISTIC MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSIONS BETHEEN EAST AND WEST. WE NEVER CONSIDERED CONFRONTATION, EVEN WHEN IMPOSED ON US BY THE OTHER SIDE, OR CONTAINMENT AN ENO IN ITSELF. NOR DID WE BELIEVE THAT DISAGREEMENTS NITH THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AUTOM MATICALLY DISAPPEAR. ON THE CONTRARY, THE VERY CONCEPT OF "DETENTE" HAS ALWAYS BEEN APPLICABLE ONLY TO AN ADVERSARY RELATIONSHIP. IT WAS DESIGNED TO PREVENT COMPETITION FROM SLIDING INTO MILITARY HOSTILITIES AND TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR THE RELATIONSHIP TO BE GRADUALLY AND PRUDENTLY IMPROVED.

33. THUS ALLIANCE POLICY TOWARD THE EAST HAS HAD TWO

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NECESSARY DIMENSIONS, WE SEEK TO PREVENT THE SOVIET UNION FROM TRANSFORMING ITS MILITARY POWER INTO POLITICAL EXPANSION, AT THE SAME TIME HE SEEK TO RESOLVE CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES THROUGH NEGOTIATION, AND TO STRENGTMEN THE INCENTIVES FOR MODERATION BY EXPANDING THE AREA OF CON-

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STRUCTIVE RELATIONS.

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34. THESE TWO DIMENSIONS ARE MUTUALLY REINFORCING. A STRONG DEFENSE AND RESISTANCE TO ADVENT/URISM ARE PRE-REQUISITES FOR EFFORTS OF CONCILIATION. BY THE SAME TOKEN, ONLY A DEMONSTRATED COMMITMENT TO PEACE CAN SUSTAIN DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE AND A VIGILANT FOREIGN POLICY. OUR PUBLIC AND CONGRESS WILL NOT BACK POLICIES WHICH APPEAR TO INVITE CRISES: NOR WILL THEY SUPPORT FIRMNESS IN A CRISIS UNLESS THEY ARE CON-VINCED THAT PEACEFUL AND HONORABLE ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED, ABOVE ALL, WE OWE IT TO OURSELVES AND TO FUTURE GENERATIONS TO SEEK A WORLD BASED ON SOMETHING MORE STABLE AND HOPEFUL THAN A BALANCE OF TERROR CONSTANTLY CONTESTED.

35. HONEVER WE LABEL SUCH A POLICY' IT IS IMPOSED GY THE UNPRECEDENTED CONDIONS OF THE NUCLEAR AGE. NO STATES. MAN CAN LIGHTLY RISK THE LIVES OF TENS OF MILLIONS. EVERY AMERICAN PRESIDENT, AFTER ENTERING OFFICE AND SEEING THE FACTS, HAS COME TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S VIEW THAT "THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO PEACE."

36. OUR GENERATION HAS BEEN TRAUMATIZED BY NORLD WAR II, BECAUSE WE REMEMBER THAT WAR BROKE OUT AS A RESULT OF AN IMBALANCE OF POWER. THIS IS A LESSON WE MUST NOT FORGET. BUT NEITHER MUST WE FORGET THE LESSON OF WORLD WAR I, MHEN WAR BROKE O/UT DESPITE AN EQUILIBRIUM OF POWER. AN INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE HELD TOGETHER ONLY BY A BALANCE OF FORCES WILL SOONER OR LATER COLLAPSE IN CATASTROPHE. IN OUR TIME THIS COULD SPELL THE END OF CIVILIZED LIFE. WE MUST THEREFORE CONDUCT A DIPLOMACY THAT DETERS

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CHALLENGES IF POSSIBLE AND THAT CONTAINS THEM AT TOLER. ABLE LEVELS IF THEY PROVE UNAVOIDABLE: A DIPLOMACY THAT RESOLVES ISSUES, NURTURES RESTRAINT AND BUILDS COOPER\* ATION BASED ON MUTUAL INTEREST.

37. THIS POLICY HAS CRITICS IN ALL OUR COUNTRIES. SOME TAKE FOR GRANTED THE RELATIVE ABSENCE OF SERIOUS CRISES IN RECENT YEARS, WHICH THE POLICY HAS HELPED TO BRING ABOUT, AND THEN FAULT IT FOR NOT PRODUCING THE MILLENIUM, WHICH IT NEVER CLAIMED. SOME CARICATURE ITS OBJECTIVES, PORTRAYING ITS GOALS IN MORE EXALTED TERMS THAN ANY OF ITS ADVOCATES, AND THEN EXPRESS DISMAY AT THE FAILURE OF REALITY TO CONFORM TO THIS IMPOSSIBLE STANDARD. THEY DESCRIBE DETENTE AS IF IT MEANT THE END OF ALL RIVALRY! WHEN RIVALRY PERSISTS, THEY CONCLUDE THAT DETENTE HAS FAILED AND CHARGE ITS ADVOCATES WITH DECEPTION OR NAIVETE. THEY MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF POLICY TOWARD ADVENSARIES BY CRITERIA THAT SHOULD BE RESERVED FOR TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIPS. THEY USE THE REALITY OF CON-PETITION TO ATTACK THE GOAL OF COEXISTENCE, RATHER THAN TO ILLUSTRATE ITS NECESSITY.

36. IN FACT, THIS POLICY HAS NEVER BEEN BASED ON SUCH MOPE OR GULLIBILITY, IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN DESIGNED TO CREATE CONDITIONS IN WHICH A COOL CALCULUS OF INTERESTS WOULD DICTATE RESTRAINT RATHER THAN OPPORTUNISM, SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICTS RATHER THAN THEIR EXACERBATION. WESTERN POLICIES CAN AT BEST MANAGE AND SHAPE. NOT ASSUME AWAY, EASTWHEST COMPETITION.

39. A PIVOT OF THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP IS THE US-SOVIET NEGOTIATION ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. INCREASINGLY, STRATEGIC FORCES FIND THEIR FUNCTION ONLY IN DETERRING AND MATCHING EACH OTHER. A CONTINUING BUILD UP OF STRATEGIC ARHS THEREFORE ONLY LEADS TO FRESH HALANCES ... BIUT AT HIGHER LEVELS OF EXPENDITURES AND UNCERTAINTIES. IN AN ERA OF EXPANDING TECHNOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE RATIONAL CHOICES OF FORCE PLANNING WITHOUT SOME ELEMENTS OF PRE-DICTABILITY IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT. MOREOVER, A CONTINUING RACE DIVERTS RESO/URCES FROM OTHER NEEDED AREAS SUCH AS FORCES FOR REGIONAL DEFENSE, WHERE IMBALANCES CAN MAVE SERIOUS GEOPOLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. ALL THESE FACTORS HAVE MADE ARMS LIMITATION & PRACTICAL INTEREST OF BOTH SIDES, AS WELL AS A FACTOR FOR STABILITY IN THE WORLD.

48. WE MAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS TOWARD CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE IN RECENT YEARS. WE WILL

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CONTINUE VIGOROUSLY TO PURSUE THIS OBJECTIVE IN WAYS WHICH PROTECT NESTERN INTERESTS AND REFLECT THE COUNSEL OF OUR ALLIES.

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41. IN DEFINING AND PURSUING POLICIES OF RELAXING TENSIONS WITH THE EAST, THE UNITY OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES IS ESSENTIAL. OUR CONSULTATIONS HAVE BEEN INTENSIVE AND FREQUENT, AND THE RECORD OF WESTERN CO-HESION IN RECENT YEARS HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING=IN THE NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE FO/UR POWER AGREEMENT ON BERLIN; IN THE HUTUAL BALANCED FORCE RED/UCTION TALKS; IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS AND IN THE PREPARATION FOR THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE.

42. ALLIED COOPERATION AND THE HABITS OF CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WHICH WE HAVE FORMED, WILL BE EVEN MORE IMPORTANT IN THE FUTURE. FOR AS THE POLICY OF RELAXING TENSIONS PROCEEDS, IT WILL INVOLVE ISSUES AT THE HEART OF ALL OUR INTERESTS.

43. NO ONE SHOULD DOUBT THE DEPTH OF OUR COMMITMENT TO THIS PROCESS. BUT WE ALSO NEED TO BE CLEAR ABOUT ITS LIMITS AND ABOUT D/UR CONCEPTION OF RECIPROCITY: ...WE SHOULD REQUIRE CONSISTENT PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE WORLD. THE WEST MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT COEXISTENCE RE. QUIRES MUTUAL RESTRAINT, NOT ONLY IN EUROPE AND IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BUT ALSO IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IN AFRICA, IN ASIA-WIN FACT, GLOBALLY. THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS, AT THEIR OSLO MEETING LAST MONTH, STRESSED THE CLOSE LINK BETWEEN STABILITY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. ME MUST ENDORSE THIS NOT ONLY BY OUR RHETORIC, BUT ABOVE ALL BY OUR ACTIONS.

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\*\*\*WE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THE TOLERABLE DEFINITION OF GLOBAL IDEOLOGICAL RIVALRY. WE DO NOT SHRINK FROM IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION, WE HAVE EVERY REASON FOR CONFIDENCE IN THE INDESTRUCTIBLE - POMER OF MAN'S YEARNING FOR FREEDOM, BUT WE CANNOT AGREE THAT IDEOLOGY ALONE IS INVOLVED MMEN SOVIET POWER IS EXTENDED INTO AREAS SUCH AS SOUTHERN AFRICA IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL LIBER\* ATION, OR WHEN REGIONAL OR LOCAL INSTABILITES ARE GENERATED OR EXPLOITED IN THE NAME OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM. \*\*\* ME SHOULD NOT ALLOW THE SOVIET UNION TO APPLY

DETENTE SELECTIVELY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. COMPETITION AMONG US IN OUR DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD THE EAST RISKS DIS-SIPATING WESTERN ADVANTAGES AND OPENING UP SOVIET OPPORTUNITIES, WE MUST RESIST DIVISION AND MAINTAIN THE CLOSEST COORDINATION.

44. THE PROCESS OF IMPROVING EAST=WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE MUST NOT BE CONFINED TO RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. THE BENEFITS OF RELAXATION OF TENSIONS MUST EXTEND TO EASTERN AS WELL AS WESTERN EUROPE.

45. THERE SHOULD BE NO ROOM FOR MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT UNITED STATES POLICY:

- \*\*\*WE ARE DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH EASTERN EUROPE ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF EACH OF ITS COUNTRIES. WE RECOGNIZE NO SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND NO PRETENSIONS TO HEGEMONY. TWO AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AND SEVERAL CABINET OFFICIALS HAVE VISITED ROMANIA AND POLAND AS WELL AS NON-ALIGNED YUGOSLAVIA, TO DEMONSTRATE OUR STAKE IN THE FLOURISHING AND INDEPENDENCE OF THOSE NATIONS.
- --FOR THE SAME REASON, HE WILL PERSIST IN OUR EFFORTS TO IMPROVE OUR CONTACTS AND DEVELOP OUR CONCRETE BILATERAL RELATIONS IN ECONOMIC AND OTHER FIELDS WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE.
- -- THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE EFFORTS OF WEST EUROPEAN NATIONS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TIES WITH THE COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. WE HOPE THAT THIS PROCESS WILL WELP HEAL THE DIVISIONS OF EUROPE WHICH HAVE PERSISTED SINCE WORLD HAR II.
- --AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLE IN EASTERN EUROPE IN BABIC HUMAN TERMS--SUCH AS FREER EMIGRATION, THE UNIFICATION OF FAMILIES, GREATER FLOW OF IN-

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FORMATION, INCREASED ECONOMIC INTERCHANGE, AND MORE OPPORTUNITIES FOR TRAVEL.

46. THE UNITED STATES, IN PARALLEL WITH ITS ALLIES, WILL

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CONTINUE TO EXPAND RELATIONSHIPS WITH EASTERN EUROPE AS FAR AND AS FAST AS IS POSSIBLE. THIS IS A LONG\*TERM PROCESS; IT IS ABSURD TO IMAGINE THAT ONE CONFERENCE BY ITSELF CAN TRANSFORM THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS. RHETORIC IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR PATIENT AND REALISTIC ACTIONS. WE WILL RAISE NO EXPECTATIONS THAT WE CANNOT FULFILL. BUT WE WILL NEVER CEASE TO ASSERT OUR TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN LIBERTY AND NATIONAL SELF=DETERMINATION.

47. THE COURSE OF EAST=WEST RELATIONS WILL INEVITABLY HAVE ITS OBSTACLES AND SETBACKS. WE WILL GUARD AGAINST EROSION OF THE GAINS THAT WE HAVE MADE IN A SERIES OF DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS; WE WILL ENSURE THAT AGREEMENTS ALREADY NEGOTIATED ARE PROPERLY INFLEMENTED. WE MUST AVOID BOTH SENTIMENTALITY THAT MOULD SUBSTIT/UTE GOOD WILL FOR STRENGTH, AND MOCK TOUGHNESS THAT HOULD SUBSTITUTE POST/RING FOR A CLEAR CONCEPTION OF OUR PURPOSES.

48. WE IN THE WEST HAVE THE MEANS TO PURSUE THIS POLICY SUCCESSFULLY, INDEED WE HAVE NO REALISTIC ALTERNATIVE, WE HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR FROM COMPETITION. IF THERE IS A MILITARY COMPETITION, WE HAVE THE STRENGTH TO DEFEND OUR INTERESTS. IF THERE IS AN ECONOMIC COMPE-TITION, WE WON IT LONG AGO. IF THERE IS AN IDEO-LOGICAL COMPETITION, THE POWER OF OUR IDEAS DEPENDS ONLY ON GURILL TO UPHOLD THEM.

49. WE NEED ONLY TO STAY TOGETHER AND STAY THE COURSE. IF WE DO SO, THE PROCESS OF EAST=WEST RELATIONS CAN, OVER TIME, STRENGTHEN THE FABRIC OF PEACE AND GENUINELY

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IMPROVE THE LIVES OF ALL THE PEOPLES AROUND THE WORLD.

50. DUR ECONOMIC STRENGTH: ONE OF THE GREATEST STRENGTHS OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES IS THEIR UNQUESTIONED ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE, PARTLY BECAUSE WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE FREE MARKET SYSTEM WHICH HAS GIVEN US THIS PREEMINENCE, WE MAVE NOT YET FULLY REALIZED THE POSSIBILITIES == INDEED THE NECESSITY == OF APPLYING OUR ECONOMIC STRENGTH CONSTRUCTIVELY TO SHAPING A BETTER INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

51. THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES TOGETHER ACCOUNT FOR 65 PER CENT OF THE WORLD'S PRODUCTION AND 70 PER CENT OF ITS COMMERCE, OUR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DRIVES INTER-NATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE, OUR INVESTMENT, TECHNOLOGY, MANAGERIAL EXPERTISE, AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY ARE THE SPUR TO DEVELOPMENT AND WELL-BEING AROUND THE WORLD. OUR ENORMOUS CAPACITIES ARE MULTIPLIED IF WE COORDINATE OUR POLICIES AND EFFORTS.

52. THE CORE OF DUR STRENGTH IS THE VITALITY AND GROWTH OF OUR OWN ECONOMIES. AT THE RAMBOUILLET ECONOMIC SUMMIT LAST NOVEMBER, AT THE PUERTO RICO SUMMIT NEXT NEEK, IN THE DECD, AND IN MANY OTHER FORUMS, THE MAJOR DEMOCRATIC NATIONS HAVE SHOWN THEIR ABILITY TO WORK TOGETHER. BUT AN EXTENSIVE AGENDA STILL SJUMMONS US. WE WILL REQUIRE FURTHER EFFORTS TO CONTINUE OUR RECOVERY AND PRONOTE NON-INFLATIONARY GROWTH. WE WIL/LNEED TO FACILITATE ADEQUATE INVESTMENT AND SUPPLIES OF RAN MATERIALS. WE MUST CONTINUE TO AVOID PROTECTIONIST MEASURES. AND WE MUST USE THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE MULTI-LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS TO STRENGTHEN AND EXPAND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADINO SYSTEM, WE NEED TO REDUCE OUR VULNERABILITY AND DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED OIL THROUGH CONSERVATION, NEW SOURCES OF ENERGY, AND COLLECTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBLE EMERGENCIES. AND WE MUST BUILD ON THE PROGRESS MADE AT RAMBOUILLET AND AT JAMAICA LAST JANUARY TO IMPROVE THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM.

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53. OUR CENTRAL CHALLENGE IS TO POOL OUR STRENGTHS, TO INCREASE OUR COORDINATION, AND TO TAILOR OUR POLICIES TO THE LONG TERM. ON THE BASIS OF SOLID COOPERATION AMONG OURSELVES, WE MUST DEAL MORE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE CHALLEN= GES OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMY -- SUCH AS OUR ECONOMIC RELA= TIDNS WITH THE CENTRALLY=PLANNED COMMUNIST ECONOMIES AND WITH THE SCORES OF NEW NATIONS CONCERNED WITH DEVELOP= MENT.

54. EAST-WEST ECONOMIC INTERCHANGE, WHILE SMALL IN REL/A= TIVE SCALE, IS BECONING AN IMPORTANT ECONOMIC AND POLIYICAL FACTOR, THIS GROWTH REFLECTS OUR FUNDAMENTAL STRENGTH. IT CARJKES RISKS AND COMPLICATIONS, BOTH POLIYICAL AND ECONOMIC. BUT IT ALSO PRESENTS OPPORTUNI= THES FOR STABLIZING RELATIONS AND INVOLVING THE COMMUN= IST COUNTRIES IN RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL CONOUCT. IF THE DEMOCRACIES PURSUE PARALLEL POLICIES == NOT ALLOWING THE COMMUNIST STATES TO STIMULATE DEBILITATING COMPETI= TION AMONG US OR TO MANIPULATE THE PROCESS FOR THEIR OWN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE == EAST=WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS CAN BE A FACTOR FOR PEACE AND NELL=BEING.

55. WE MUST ENSURE THAT BENEFITS ARE RECIPROCAL. WE MUST AVOID LARGE TRADE IMBALANCES WHICH COULD OPEN OPPORTUNI-TIES FOR POLITICAL PRESSURE. WE SHOULD STRUCTURE ECON-OMIC RELATIONS SO THAT THE COMMUNIST STATES WILL BE DRAWN INTO THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM AND ACCEPT ITS DISCIPLINES. WHEN DEALING WITH CENTRALLY CONTROLLED STATE ECONOMIES. HE HAVE TO REALIZE THAT ECONOMIC RELA-TIONS HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL CONTENT AND CANNOT BE CONDUCTED SOLELY ON THE NORMAL COMMERCIAL BASES.

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OBVIOUSLY, PROFITABILITY MUST BE ONE STANDARD. BUT WE NEED & BROADER STRATEGY, CONSISTENT WITH OUR FREE ENTER\* PRISE SYSTEM, SO THAT ECONOMIC RELATIONS WILL CONTRIBUTE TO POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES SHOULD COORDINATE THEIR POLICIES TO ENSURE THE ORDERLY AND HENEFICIAL EVOLUTION OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. TO THESE ENDS. THE UNITON STATES HAS PROPOSED TO THE DECD THAT WE INTENSIFY OUR ANALYSES OF THE PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES INHERENT IN EAST WEST TRADE WITH A VIEW TO CHARTING COMMON OBJECTIVES AND APPROACHES.

56. IF THE ECONOMIC STRENGTH OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRAC. IES IS IMPORTANT TO THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, IT IS VITAL FOR THE DEVELOPING HORLD. THESE NATIONS SEEKSHO OVERCOME PERVASIVE POVERTY AND TO LIFT THE HORIZONS OF THEIR PEOPLES: THEY ASK FOR AN EQUITABLE SHARE OF GLOBAL ECON-UNIC BENEFITS ANOTHA GREATER ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THEM.

57 . THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPMENT IS CRUCIAL NOT ONLY FOR THE POORER NATIONS BUT FOR THE INDUSTRIAL NATIONS AS WELL. OUR OWN PROSPERITY IS CLOSELY LINKED TO THE RAW MATERIALS, THE MARKETS, AND THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER CAN BE STABLE ONLY IF ALL NATIONS PERCEIVE IT AS FUNDAMENTALLY JUST AND ARE CONVINCED THAT THEY HAVE A STAKE IN IT. OVER THE LONG TERM, COOPERATIVE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS ARE THUS CLEARLY IN THE INTEREST OF ALL, AND THE OBJECTIVES OF INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SHOULD BE COMPLE-MENTARY.

58. HOMEVER, THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE HAS BEEN FAR FROM SHOOTH, TACTICS OF PRESSURE AND AN EMPHASIS ON RHETOR. ICAL VICTORIES AT CONFERENCES MAVE TOO OFTEN CREATED AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFRONTATION. SUCH ATTITUDES OBSCURE THE FUNDAMENTAL REALITY THAT DEVELOPMENT IS AN ARDUOUS LONG\* TERM ENTERPRISE. IT WILL GO FORWARD ONLY IF BOTH SIDES FACE FACTS WITHOUT ILLUSIONS, SHUNNING BOTH CONFRONTATION AND SENTIMENTALITY.

50. FAR MORE IS INVOLVED THAN THE MECHANICAL APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL TO POVERTY. THERE MUST BE WITHIN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRY & SENSE OF PURPOSE AND DIRECTION, DETERMINED LEADERS IP, AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT, AN IMPULSE FOR CHANGE AMONG THE PEOPLE. DEVELOPMENT REQUIRES RATIONAL ADMINISTRATION, & COMPLEX INFRASTRUCTURE, A REVISED SYSTEM OF EDUCTION, AND MANY OTHER SOCIAL REFORMS. IT IS A PROFOUNDLY UNSETTLING PROCESS THAT TAKES DECADES. FOR MANY NEW COUNTRIES IT IS

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IN FACT EVEN MORE DIFFICULT THAN SIMILAR EFFORTS BY THE ESTERN COUNTRIES & CENTRY AGO, FOR THEIR SOCIAL AND

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GEOGRAPHIC CONDITIONS REFLECT THE ARBITRARY SUBDIVISIONS OF COLONIAL RULE, BOME FACE OBSTACLES WHICH COULD NOT BE SURMOUNTED EVEN WITH THE GREATEST EXERTIONS ON THEIR OWN, THEIR PROGRESS DEPENDS ON HOW WELL THE INTERNATION= AL COMMUNITY RESPONDS TO THE IMPERATIVES OF ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE.

60. IT IS SENSELESS, THEREFORE, TO PRETEND THAT DEVELOP-MENT CAN PROCEED BY QUICK FIXES OR ONE-SHOT SOLUTIONS. ARTIFICIAL MAJORITIES AT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CON-FUSE THE ISSUE, CONFRONTATIONAL TACTICS WILL IN TIME DESTROY THE DOMESTIC SUPPORT IN THE INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES FOR THE FORWARD-LOOKING POLICY WHICH THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SO DESPERATELY NEED.

61. THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES HAVE SPECIAL RESPONSIBIL. ITIES AS WELL, DEVELOPMENT REQUIRES THEIR SUSTAINED AND COLLECTIVE COOPERATION. THEY REPRESENT THE LARGEST MARKETS AND MOST OF THE WORLD'S TECHNOLOGY AND CAPITAL. THEY HAVE AN DBLIGATION TO S//OH UNDERSTAND. ING FOR THE PLIGHT OF T//E POOREST AND THE STRIVING FOR PROGRESS OF ALL DEVELOPING NATIONS. BUT THEY DO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NO FAVOR IF THEY CONTRIBUTE TO ESCAPISM. IF THEY COMPETE TO CURRY FAVOR OVER ESSEN. TIALLY PROPAGANDISTIC ISSUES' CONTRIBUTIONS WILL BE DILUYED, RESOURCES WILL GO UNALLOCATED, AND UNWORKABLE PROJECTS WILL BE ENCOURAGED.

62. THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES NEED FROM US NOT A SENSE OF GUILT BUT INTELLIGENT AND REALISTIC PROPOSALS THAT MERGE THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES IN AN EXPANDING WORLD ECONOMY.

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••FIRST, WE MUST DEVELOP FURTHER THE MECHANISMS OF DUR DWN CODPERATION. TO THIS END THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE A NUMBER OF CONCRETE PROPOSALS AT THE RECENTLY CONCLUDED DECD MEETING.

\*\*SECOND, THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES SHOULD COORDIN. ATE THEIR NATIONAL AID PROGRAMS BETTER SO THAT WE USE OUR RESPECTIVE AREAS OF EXPERIENCE AND TECHNI-CAL SKILL TO BEST ADVANTAGE, PRESIDENT GISCARD'S PROPOSAL FOR AN INTEGRATED WESTERN FUND FOR AFRICA IS AN INAGINATIVE APPROACH TO REGIONAL DEVELOP.

MENT .

THIRD, WE SHOULD REGULARLY CONSULT AND WORK IN CLOSE PARALLEL IN MAJOR INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS AND CONFERENCES. THE CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION: THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY SPECIAL SESSIONS; WORLD CONFERENCES ON FOOD, POPULATION. ENVIRONMENT OR HOUSING; AND UNCTAD A/L CAN ACHIEVE MUCH MORE IF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES APPROACH THEM WITH A CLEAR AND COHERENT PURPOSE. ...FOURTH, WE SHOULD STOP CONDUCTING ALL NEGOTIATIONS ON AN AGENDA NOT OUR OWN, WE SHOULD NOT HESI.

TATE TO PUT FORWARD OUR OWN SOLUTIONS TO COMMON PROBLEMS,

AND FINALLY WE NEED A CLEAR LONGER=TERM STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT. THE DIVERSE ELEMENTS OF THE PROCESS. INCLUDING VARIOUS FORMS OF ASSISTANCE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. TRADE AND FIMANCIAL POLICY, MUST BE BETTER INTEGRATED.

63. COOPERATION AMONG DEVELOPED COUNTRIES IS NOT CON-FRONTATION BETWEEN NORTH AND BOUTH, AS IS OFTEN ALLEGED. THE FACT IS THAT A RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT POLICY IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES PURSUE REALISTIC GOALS WITH CONVICTION, COMPASSION, AND COORDIN-ATION. THEY MUST NOT DELUDE THEMSELVES OR THEIR INTER-LOCUTORS BY EASY PANACEAS, OR MISTAKE SLOGANS FOR PROG-NESS, ME MAKE THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPMENT IFE INSIST THAT THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE EMPHASIZE SUBSTANCE RATHER THAN IDEOLOGY, AND CONCENTRATE ON PRACTICAL PROGRAMS, INSTEAD OF EMPTY THEOLOGICAL DEBATES.

64. THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES IN EVERY DIMENSION OF OUR ACTIVITIES, THEN, THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES ENTER THE NEW ERA WITH SUB= STANTIAL CAPACITIES AND OPPORTUNITIES. AT THE SAME TIME, IT WOULD BE IDLE TO DENY THAT IN RECENT YEARS THE MORAL STAMINA OF THE WEST HAS BEEN SERIOUSLY CHALLENGED.

65. SINCE ITS BEGINNINGS, WESTERN GIVILIZATION HAS

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CLEARLY DEFINED THE INDIVIDUAL'S RELATIONSHIP TO SOCIETY AND THE STATE. IN SOUTHERN EUROPE, THE HUMANISH OF THE

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TO SECSTATE WASHOC IMMEDIATE 2249

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RENAISSANCE MADE MAN THE MEASURE OF ALL THINGS. IN NORTHERN EUROPE, THE REFORMATION, IN PROCLAIMING THE PRIESTHOOD OF ALL BELIEVERS AND OFFERING REWARDS FOR INDIVIDUAL EFFORT, PUT THE EMPHASIS ON THE INDIVIDUAL. IN ENGLAND, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES EVOLVED IN THE ELABORATION OF THE COMMON LAM. TWO HUNDRED YEARS AGD THE AUTHORS OF DUR DECLARA TION OF INDEPENDENCE DREW UPON THIS HERITAGE; TO THEM EVERY HUMAN SEING MAD INALIENABLE RIGHTS TO LIFE, LIBER TY AND THE PURSUIT OF MAPPINESS. THE STATE EXISTED TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL AND PERMIT FULL SCOPE FOR THE ENJDYMENT OF THESE RIGHTS.

66. TODAY IN THE WEST, THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE MARSHALL PLAN, OUR DEEPEST CHALLENGE IS THAT A NEW GENERATION MUST EXPLORE AGAIN THE ISSUES OF LIBERTY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, IN AN ERA WHEN SOCIETIES HAVE GROWN VASTLY IN SIZE, COMPLEXITY AND DYNAMISM. THE MGOERN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, THOUGH FOUNDED IN FREEDOM AND OFFER ING PROSPERITY, RISKS LOSING THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE MASS AND FOSTERING HIS ALIENATION. THE TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY OF PUBLIC ISSUES CHALLENGES THE FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRACY. MASS MEDIA AND THE WEAKENING OF PARTY AND GROUP STRUCTURES FURTHER THE ISGLATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL; THEY TRANSFORM DEMOCRATIC POLITICS, ADDING NEW ELEMENTS OF VOLATILITY AND UNPREDICTABILITY. THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE POSES A FUNDAMENTAL CHALLENGE TO POLITICAL LEADER. SHIP AND RESPONSIVENESS TO PUBLIC WILL.

67. BASIC MORAL QUESTIONS ARE RAISED: HOW DO WE INSPIRE A QUESTIONING NEW GENERATION IN A RELATIVIST AGE AND IN A SOCIETY OF IMPERSONAL INSTITUTIONS? WILL SKEPTICISM

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AND CYNICISM SAP THE SPIRITUAL ENERGIES OF OUR CIVILIZA-TION AT THE MOMENT OF ITS GREATEST TECHNICAL AND MATERIAL SUCCESS? HAVING DEBUNKED AUTHORITY, WILL OUR SOCIETIES NOW SEEK REFUGE IN FALSE SIMPLIFICATIONS, DEMAGDGIC CERTITUDES, OR EXTREMIST PANACEAS?

68. THESE QUESTIONS ARE NOT A PREDICTION BUT A TEST \*\* A TEST OF THE CREATIVITY AND MORAL FORTITUDE OF OUR PEOPLES AND LEADERS.

69. WESTERN CIVILIZATION HAS MET SUCH TESTS BEFORE. IN THE LATE FIFTEENTH CENTURY, EUROPE WAS IN A PERIOD OF GLOOMY INTROSPECTION, PHEOCCUPIED WITH A SENSE OF DESPAIR AND MORTALITY. THE CITIES WHICH HAD SPARKED ITS REVIVAL FOLLOWING THE ISLAMIC CONQUESTS WERE IN DECLINE. ITS TERRITORY WAS BEING DIMINISHED BY THE DEPRADATIONS OF A POWERFUL INVADER FROM THE EAST. ITS SPIRITUAL, ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL CENTER \*\* ITALY \*\* WAS A PREY TO ANARCHY AND DISMEMBERMENT.

70. AND YET. EUROPE AT THAT VERY MOMENT WAS ALREADY WELL LAUNCHED ON ONE OF THE WORLO'S PERIODS OF GREATEST POLITICAL AND INTELLECTUAL ADVANCE. THE RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION, THE GREAT DISCOVERIES, THE REVIVAL OF MUMANISTIC VALUES, THE INDUSTRIAL AND DEMOGRATIC REVOLU-TIONS - THESE WERE ALL TO CREATE THE CHARACTER AND THE DYNAMISH OF THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION OF WHICH WE, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ATLANTIC, ARE THE HEIRS.

71. SIMILARLY TODAY, THE WEST HAS ASSETS TO MEET ITS CHALLENGES AND TO DRAW FROM THEM THE MATERIAL FOR NEW ACTS OF CREATION. IT IS OUR NATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN THE VAMGUARO OF THE MODERN AGE. INTELLECTUALLY AND MORALLY. IT IS OUR SOCIETIES THAT HAVE PROVEN THEMSELVES THE VAST LABORATORY OF THE EXPERIMENT OF MODERNIZATION. ABOVE ALL, IT IS THE RESTERN DEMOCRACIES THAT ORIGINATED \*\* AND KEEP ALIVE TODAY \*\* TUE VISION OF POLITICAL FREEDOM, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND ECONOMIC WELL\*BEING FOR ALL PEOPLES. MONE OF US LIVES UP TO THIS VISION IDEALLY, OR ALL THE TIME. BUT THE RIGOROUS STANDARD BY WHICH WE JUDGE OURSELVES IS WHAT MAKES US DIFFERENT FROM TOTALITARIAN SOCIETIES, OF THE LEFT OR THE RIGHT.

### 72. THIS, THEN IS OUR MORAL TASK:

73. FIRST, AS DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS WE MUST REDEEM. OVER AND OVER AGAIN, THE TRUST OF OUR PEOPLES, AS A NATION WHICH HAS ACCEPTED THE BURDEN OF LEADERSHIP, THE UNITED STATES HAS A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY: WE MUST

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OVERCOME THE TRAUMAS OF THE RECENT PERIOD, ERADICATE THEIR CAUSES AND PRESERVE THE QUALITIES NHICH WORLD

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LEADERSHIP DEMANDS. IN EUROPE, WHEREVER THERE HAS BEEN A SLACKENING IN GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIVENESS TO THE NEEDS OF CITIZENS, THERE SHOULD BE REFORM AND REVIVAL.

74. SECOND, WE MUST CONFRONT THE COMPLEXITIES OF A PLURALISTIC WORLD. THIS CALLS FOR MORE THAN SPECIFIC TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS. IT REQUIRES OF LEADERS A WILL. INGNESS TO EXPLAIN THE REAL ALTERNATIVES, NO MATTER HOW COMPLICATED OR DIFFICULT. AND IT REQUIRES OF ELECTORATES AN /UNDERSTANDING THAT WE MUST MAKE CHOICES AMIDST UNCERTAINTY, WHERE THE OUTCOME MAY BE NEITHER INMEDIATE NOR REDUCIBLE TO SIMPLE SLOGANS.

75. THIRD, WE MUST CLARIFY DUR ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITI-CAL FORCES WITHIN WESTERN SOCIETIES WHICH APPEAL TO ELECTORATES ON THE GROUND THAT THEY MAY BRING GREATER EFFICIENCY TO GOVERNMENT. BUT WE CANNOT AVOID THE QUESTION OF THE COMMITMENT OF THESE FORCES TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES, NOR A CONCERN ABOUT THE TRENDS THAT A DECISION BASED ON TEMPORARY CONVENIENCE WOULD SET IN MOTION. AT THE SAME TIME, OPPOSITION TO THESE FORCES IS CLEARLY NOT ENOUGH. THERE MUST BE A RESPONSE TO LEGITIMATE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPIRATIONS AND TO THE MEED FOR REFORMS OF INADEQUACIES FRON WHICH THESE FORCES DERIVE MUCH OF THEIR APPEAL.

76. FINALLY, THE SOLIDARITY OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONS IN THE WORLD IS ESSENTIAL BOTH AS MATERIAL SUPPORT AND AS A MORAL SYMBOL. THERE COULD BE NO GREATER INSPIRATION OF OUR PEOPLES THAN THE REAFFIRMATION OF THEIR COMMON PUR-POSE AND THE CONVICTION THAT THEY CAN SHAPE THEIR FORTUNE IN FREEDOM.

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77. WE CANNOT AFFORD EITHER A PERILOUS COMPLACENCY OR IMMOBILIZING PESSIMISM. ALASTAIR BUCHAN POSED HIS QUES= TIONS NOT TO INDUCE PARALYSIS BUT AS A SPUR TO HISER ACTION AND FRESH ACHIEVEMENT.

78. WE KNOW WHAT WE MUST DO.

79. WE ALSO KNOW WHAT WE CAN DO.

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80. IT ONLY REMAINS TO DO IT. KISSINGER





## THE INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES: THE IMPERATIVE OF COOPERATION

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger's address before the International Institute for Strategic Studies inaugurating the Alastair Buchan memorial lecture series.

Ladies and gentlemen, friends: On my arrival in Washington seven years ago, one of my first acts was to gather a group of senior scholars of European affairs to have them give their advice to a new President on relations with our allies. The chairman of that group was Alastair Buchan.

He should not be held responsible for the results. But it was only natural to seek his counsel. For Alastair was more than a distinguished expert; he was a consummate man of the West. A Scot by birth, he considered himself, and referred to himself, as a European. He lived many years in the United States and visited us often, applying his incisive mind to the study of America and its role in the world. He was a champion of the importance, indeed the inevitability, of the transatlantic tie between North America and Europe.

Beneath the skeptical air was a passionate commitment to the values and traditions we cherish as Western civilization. Sir Peter Ramsbotham [U.K. Ambassador to the United States] said in his eulogy of Alastair in Washington that no other countryman of his had contributed more to the understanding of international affairs and the strategic implications of nuclear power in the latter half of the 20th century. But Alastair's focus was not simply the structure of global politics and the June 25, 1976 London, England Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Media Services

roots of war; it was the central role of the West in preserving peace and giving it more purpose.

This institute is a monument to his quest.

Alastair had that combination of intellect and compassion known as wisdom. It motivated the great contribution he made to scholarship and to a generation's understanding of the transformation of international relationships. He has left his mark on every person in this hall. During the last seven years, he never hesitated to scold me in all friendship when he thought that American policy did not do justice to the great cause of European-American cooperation. I would like to think that, had he lived, he would feel that, after many starts, we have made great strides in strengthening the unity of the West. And if that were his conviction, I for one would be very proud.

"Structural changes," Alastair wrote, "are occurring in the relative power and influence of the major states; there has been a quantitative change of colossal proportions in the interdependence of Western societies and in the demands we make on natural resources; and there are qualitative changes in the preoccupations of our societies." He then posed the question: "Can the highly industrialized states sustain or recover a quality in their national life which not only satisfies the new generation, but can act as an example or attractive force to other societies?"

All of us who wish to honor Alastair's memory must do so in the way he would want most of all—by proving that the answer to his ques-

tion is ves. A world that cries out for economic advance, for social justice, for political liberty, and for a stable peace needs our collective commitment and contribution. I firmly believe that the industrial democracies working together have the means, if they have the will, to shape creatively a new era of international affairs. Indeed we are doing so on many fronts today, thanks to the clarity Alastair brought to our purposes and directions.

A generation ago Western statesmen fashioned new institutions of collaboration to stave off a common threat. Our progress after 30 years has been striking. Global war has been deterred, and all of the industrial democracies live with an enhanced sense of security. Our economies are the most prosperous on earth; our technology and productive genius have proven indispensable for all countries seeking to better the welfare of their peoples, be they Socialist or developing. Our societies represent, more than ever, a beacon of hope to those who yearn for liberty and justice and progress. In no part of the world and under no other system do men live so well and in so much freedom. If performance is any criterion, the contest between freedom and communism, of which so much was made three decades ago, has been won by the industrial democracies.

And yet at this precise moment we hear in our countries premonitions of decline, anxieties about the travail of the West and the advance of authoritarianism. Can it be that our deeper problems are not of resources but of will, not of power but of conception?

We who overcame great dangers 30 years ago must not now paralyze ourselves with illusions of impotence. We have already initiated the construction of a new system of international relationsthis time on a global scale. We must summon the determination to work toward it in unity and mutual confidence.

For America, cooperation among the free nations is a moral, and not merely a practical, necessity. Americans have never been comfortable with calculations of interest and power alone. America, to be itself, needs a sense of identity and collaboration with other nations who share its values.

Our association with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan thus goes to the heart of our national purpose. Common endeavors with our sister democracies raise the goals of our foreign policy beyond physical survival, toward a peace of human

progress and dignity. The ties of intellectual civilization, democratic tradition, historical association, and more than a generation of common endeavor bind us together more firmly than could any pragmatic conception of national interest alone. The unity of the industrial democracies has been the cornerstone of American foreign policy for 30 years, and it will remain so for as far ahead as we can see.

So I would like to pay tribute to Alastair this evening by addressing the issues he raised: Can America, Europe, and the industrial democracies meet the challenge of the world's future? What is the state of our relationship?

## The U.S. and a United Europe

In 1973, with Viet-Nam at last behind us and fresh from new initiatives with China and the Soviet Union, the United States proposed that the collaboration of the industrial democracies be given new impetus. Military security, while still crucial, was no longer sufficient to give content or political cohesion to our broader relationship or to retain support for it from a new generation. We faced important East-West negotiations on European security and force reductions; a fresh agenda of international economic problems; the challenge of shaping anew our relationship with the developing world; and the need to redefine relations between America and a strengthened and enlarged European Community.

It is academic to debate now whether the United States acted too theoretically in proposing to approach these challenges through the elaboration of a new Atlantic declaration, or whether our European friends acted wisely in treating this proposal as a test case of European identity. The doctrinal arguments of 1973 over the procedure for Atlantic consultations, or whether Europe was exercising its proper global role, or whether economic and security issues should be linked, have in fact been settled by the practice of consultations and cooperation unprecedented in intensity and scope. The reality and success of our common endeavors have provided the best definition and revitalization of our relationship. There is no longer any question that Europe and the United States must cooperate closely, under whatever label, and that the unity of Europe is essential to that process.

In its early days, the European Community

was the focus of much American idealism, and perhaps of some paternalism, as we urged models of federal unity and transatlantic burdensharing on our European friends. By now, leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have come to understand that European unity cannot be built by Americans or to an American prescription; it must result from European initiatives.

The evolution of European initiatives-both its successes and its setbacks-inevitably gives rise to new questions about whether the United States still welcomes European unification. Let me take this occasion to emphasize our conviction that European unity is crucial for Europe, for the West, and for the world. We strongly support and encourage it.

We have perhaps become a little more sophisticated about our contribution to the process. We no longer expect that it will grow from the desire to ease American burdens. If Europe is to carry a part of the West's responsibilities in the world, it must do so according to its own conceptions and in its own interest. Alastair Buchan wrote: "It is impossible to inspire Western Europe to political unity or to encourage Japanese self-reliance unless they have the freedom and confidence to define their interests in every sphere, interests which must be reconciled with those of the United States but not subordinated to them."

The United States endorses this principle wholeheartedly. It is not healthy for the United States to be the only center of initiative and leadership in the democratic world. It is not healthy for Europe to be only a passive participant, however close the friendship and however intimate the consultation.

• For centuries it was axiomatic that increases We therefore welcome the fact that Europe's in military power could be translated into almost role in global affairs is gaining in vigor and immediate political advantage. It is now clear that effectiveness. A vital and cohesive Western Europe in strategic weaponry new increments of weapons is an irreplaceable weight on the scales of global or destructiveness do not automatically lead to diplomacy; American policy can only gain by either military or political gains. The destructivehaving a strong partner of parallel moral purposes. ness of strategic weapons has contributed to the emergence of nuclear stalemate. Neither side, if it Of course we do not want Europe to find its identity in opposition to the United States. But acts with minimum prudence, will let the balance tip against it, either in an arms race or in an agreeneither does any sensible European. Of course there will be disagreements between us of tactics, ment to limit arms.

and sometimes of perspectives, if not of ends. But I

do not believe that Americans have so lost confidence in ourselves that we must inhibit the role of others, with whom we may have occasional differences, but who share our highest values. The wisest

Security and the Democracies Security is the bedrock of all that we do. A quarter-century ago, the American defense commitment to Europe provided the shield behind which Western Europe recovered its economic health and political vitality. Today our collective alliance defense-and the U.S.-Japanese relationship-continue to be essential for global stability. But the nature of security and strategy has fundamentally changed since the time when our alliances were founded:

• The Soviet Union has recovered from the devastation of World War II and pressed vigorously ahead on the path of industrial growth. Possessing resources on a continental scale, and imposing on its people enormous sacrifices in the name of its ideology, the U.S.S.R. has developed its economic strength and technology to a point where it can match the West in many sectors of industrial and military power. It shows no signs of changing its priorities.

• Beneath the nuclear umbrella, the temptation to probe with regional forces or proxy wars increases. The steady growth of Soviet conventional military and naval power and its expanding global reach cannot be ignored. Conventional forces and

statesmen on the two sides of the ocean have always known that European unity and Atlantic partnership are both essential and mutually reinforcing.

So let us finally put behind us the debates over whether Europe's unity has American support. We consider the issue settled. Let us rather address ourselves to the urgent challenges of mutual concern which a uniting Europe, the United States, and all industrial democracies must face together-common defense, East-West relations, and the international economy.

military assistance to allies assume pivotal import- diversity, reliability, survivability, and numbers of ance. We must insure that the strength and flexibilhanced. And we must conduct a prudent and forceful foreign policy that is prepared to use our nuclear forces of two Atlantic allies. strength to block expansionism.

These new realities demand from us steadiness, above all. Democratic societies have always fluctuated in their attitude toward defensebetween complacency and alarmist concern. The industry and agriculture: Recent studies indicate long leadtimes of modern weapons and their complexity make both these aberrations dangerous. We cannot afford alternation between neglect and bursts of frenzy if we are to have a coherent defense program and public support for the necessary exertions. We need an allied defense posture that is relevant to our dangers, credible to both friends and adversaries, and justifiable to our peoples. And we must be prepared to sustain it over the long term.

It is imperative that we maintain the programs that insure that the balance is preserved. But we owe it to ourselves to see the military balance in proper perspective. Complacency may produce weakness, but exaggeration of danger can lead to a loss of will. To be sure, there has been a steady buildup of Soviet military power. But we have also seen to the steady growth and improvement of our own forces over the same period.

• We have always had to face Soviet ground forces larger than our own-partly because of the Soviet Union's definition of its needs as a power in the heart of the Eurasian landmass, with perceived threats on both flanks. Its naval power, while a growing and serious problem, is far weaker than combined allied naval strength in terms of tonnage, firepower, range, access to the sea, experience, and seamanship.

• The United States, for its part, is expanding its army from 13 to 16 divisions through new measures of streamlining forces; we are increasing our combat forces in Europe; we plan to station a new army brigade on the critical sector of the north German plain; we are augmenting our naval forces. Our European allies have completed major programs to build common infrastructure: We have undertaken new joint efforts of standardization and interoperability of allied forces.

• U.S. strategic forces are superior in accuracy.

separately targetable nuclear warheads. We have a ity of all forces capable of local defense are en- commanding lead in strategic bombers. In addition there are American deployments overseas and the

> • Even with our different priorities, the economic and technological base which underlies Western military strength remains overwhelmingly superior in size and capacity for innovation. The Soviet Union suffers endemic weakness in its that this chronic inefficiency extends even into their military sector to a much greater extent than realized before.

> These strengths of ours demonstrate that our present security posture is adequate and that it is well within our capacities to continue to balance the various elements of Soviet power. To maintain the necessary defense is a question of leadership more than of power. Our security responsibility is both manageable and unending. We must undertake significant additional efforts for the indefinite future. For as far ahead as we can see, we will live in a twilight area between tranquillity and open confrontation.

> This is a task for both sides of the Altantic. Our defense effort within the alliance will be importantly affected by the degree to which the American public is convinced that our allies share similar perceptions of the military challenge and a comparable determination to meet it. The greatest threat to the alliance would occur if, for whatever reason-through misreading the threat, or inattention to conventional forces, or reductions of the defense efforts of allies, or domestic developments within NATO members-U.S. public support for NATO were weakened.

> The challenge of building sufficient hardware is easier than those of geopolitical understanding, political coordination and, above all, resolve. In the nuclear age, once a change in the geopolitical balance has become unambiguous, it is too late to do anything about it. However great our strength, it will prove empty if we do not resist seemingly marginal changes whose cumulative impact can undermine our security. Power serves little purpose without the doctrines and concepts which define where our interests require its application.

> Therefore, let us not paralyze ourselves by a rhetoric of weakness. Let us concentrate on build

ing the understanding of our strategic interests which must underlie any policy. The fact is that nowhere has the West been defeated for lack of strength. Our setbacks have been self-inflicted, either because leaders chose objectives that were beyond our psychological capabilities or because our legislatures refused to support what the executive branch believed was essential. This-and not the various "gaps" that appear in the American debate in years divisible by four-is the deepest security problem we face.

#### East-West Relations

As long ago as the Harmel Report of December 1967, the Atlantic alliance has treated as its "two main functions" the assurance of military security and realistic measures to reduce tensions between East and West. We never considered confrontation, even when imposed on us by the other side, or containment an end in itself. Nor did we believe that disagreements with the Soviet Union would automatically disappear. On the contrary, the very concept of "detente" has always been applicable only to an adversary relationship. It was designed to prevent competition from sliding into military hostilities and to create the conditions for the relationship to be gradually and prudently improved.

Thus alliance policy toward the East has had two necessary dimensions. We seek to prevent the Soviet Union from transforming its military power into political expansion. At the same time we seek to resolve conflicts and disputes through negotiation and to strengthen the incentives for moderation by expanding the area of constructive relations.

These two dimensions are mutually reinforcing. A strong defense and resistance to adventurism are prerequisites for efforts of conciliation. By the same token, only a demonstrated commitment to peace can sustain domestic support for an adequate defense and a vigilant foreign policy. Our public and Congress will not back policies which appear to invite crises; nor will they support firmness in a crisis unless they are convinced that peaceful and honorable alternatives have been exhausted. Above all, we owe it to ourselves and to future generations to seek a world based on something more stable and hopeful than a balance of terror constantly contested.

However we label such a policy, it is imposed by the unprecedented conditions of the nuclear age. No statesman can lightly risk the lives of tens of millions. Every American president, after entering office and seeing the facts, has come to President Eisenhower's view that "there is no . . . alternative to peace."

Our generation has been traumatized by World War II, because we remember that war broke out as a result of an imbalance of power. This is a lesson we must not forget. But neither must we forget the lesson of World War I, when war broke out despite an equilibrium of power. An international structure held together only by a balance of forces will sooner or later collapse in catastrophe. In our time this could spell the end of civilized life. We must therefore conduct a diplomacy that deters challenges if possible and that contains them at tolerable levels if they prove unavoidable; a diplomacy that resolves issues, nurtures restraint, and builds cooperation based on mutual interest.

This policy has critics in all our countries. Some take for granted the relative absence of serious crises in recent years, which the policy has helped to bring about, and then fault it for not producing the millenium, which it never claimed. Some caricature its objectives, portraying its goals in more exalted terms than any of its advocates. and then express dismay at the failure of reality to conform to this impossible standard. They describe detente as if it meant the end of all rivalry; when rivalry persists, they conclude that detente has failed and charge its advocates with deception or naivete. They measure the success of policy toward adversaries by criteria that should be reserved for traditional friendships. They use the reality of competition to attack the goal of coexistence, rather than to illustrate its necessity.

In fact, this policy has never been based on such hope or gullibility. It has always been designed to create conditions in which a cool calculus of interests would dictate restraint rather than opportunism, settlement of conflicts rather than their exacerbation. Western policies can at best manage and shape, not assume away, East-West competition.

A pivot of the East-West relationship is the U.S.-Soviet negotiation on limitation of strategic arms. Increasingly, strategic forces find their function only in deterring and matching each other. A continuing buildup of strategic arms, therefore, only leads to fresh balances, but at higher levels of expenditures and uncertainties. In an era of expanding technological possibilities, it is impossible to make rational choices of force planning without some elements of predictability in the strategic environment. Moreover, a continuing race diverts resources from other needed areas such as forces for regional defense where imbalances can have serious geopolitical consequences. All these factors have made arms limitation a practical interest of both sides, as well as a factor for stability in the world.

We have made considerable progress toward curbing the strategic arms race in recent years. We will continue vigorously to pursue this objective in ways which protect Western interests and reflect the counsel of our allies.

In defining and pursuing policies of relaxing tensions with the East, the unity of the industrial democracies is essential. Our consultations have been intensive and frequent, and the record of Western cohesion in recent years has been encouraging—in the negotiations leading to the Four Power Agreement on Berlin; in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks; in the SALT negotiations [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]; and in the preparation for the European Security Conference.

Allied cooperation, and the habits of consultation and coordination which we have formed, will be even more important in the future. For as the policy of relaxing tensions proceeds, it will involve issues at the heart of all our interests.

No one should doubt the depth of our commitment to this process. But we also need to be clear about its limits and about our conception of reciprocity:

• We should require consistent patterns of behavior in different parts of the world. The West must make it clear that coexistence requires mutual restraint, not only in Europe and in the central strategic relationship but also in the Middle East, in Africa, in Asia—in fact, globally. The NATO foreign ministers, at their Oslo meeting last month, stressed the close link between stability and security in Europe and in the world as a whole. We must endorse this not only by our rhetoric, but above all by our actions.

• We should make clear the tolerable definition of global ideological rivalry. We do not shrink from

ideological competition. We have every reason for confidence in the indestructible power of man's yearning for freedom. But we cannot agree that ideology alone is involved when Soviet power is extended into areas such as southern Africa in the name of national liberation, or when regional or local instabilities are generated or exploited in the name of proletarian internationalism.

• We should not allow the Soviet Union to apply detente selectively within the alliance. Competition among us in our diplomatic or economic policies toward the East risks dissipating Western advantages and opening up Soviet opportunities. We must resist division and maintain the closest coordination.

The process of improving East-West relations in Europe must not be confined to relations with the Soviet Union. The benefits of relaxation of tensions must extend to Eastern, as well as Western, Europe.

There should be no room for misconceptions about United States policy:

• We are determined to deal with Eastern Europe on the basis of the sovereignty and independence of each of its countries. We recognize no spheres of influence and no pretensions to hegemony. Two American presidents and several cabinet officials have visited Romania and Poland as well as nonaligned Yugoslavia, to demonstrate our stake in the flourishing and independence of those nations.

• For the same reason, we will persist in our efforts to improve our contacts and develop our concrete bilateral relations in economic and other fields with the countries of Eastern Europe.

• The United States supports the efforts of West European nations to strengthen their bilateral and regional ties with the countries of Eastern Europe. We hope that this process will help heal the divisions of Europe which have persisted since World War II.

• We will continue to pursue measures to improve the lives of the people in Eastern Europe in basic human terms—such as freer emigration, the unification of families, greater flow of information, increased economic interchange, and more opportunities for travel.

The United States, in parallel with its allies,

will continue to expand relationships with Eastern Europe as far and as fast as is possible. This is a long-term process; it is absurd to imagine that one conference by itself can transform the internal structure of Communist governments. Rhetoric is no substitute for patient and realistic actions. We will raise no expectations that we cannot fulfill. But we will never cease to assert our traditional principles of human liberty and national selfdetermination.

The course of East-West relations will inevitably have its obstacles and setbacks. We will guard against erosion of the gains that we have made in a series of difficult negotiations; we will insure that agreements already negotiated are properly implemented. We must avoid both sentimentality that would substitute good will for strength, and mock toughness that would substitute posturing for a clear conception of our purposes.

We in the West have the means to pursue this policy successfully. Indeed we have no realistic alternative. We have nothing to fear from competition. If there is a military competition, we have the strength to defend our interests. If there is an economic competition, we won it long ago. If there is an ideological competition, the power of our ideas depends only on our will to uphold them.

We need only to stay together and stay the course. If we do so, the process of East-West relations can, over time, strengthen the fabric of peace and genuinely improve the lives of all the peoples around the world.

## Our Economic Strength

One of the greatest strengths of the industrial democracies is their unquestioned economic preeminence. Partly because we are committed to the free market system which has given us this preeminence, we have not yet fully realized the possibilities—indeed the necessity—of applying our economic strength constructively to shaping a better international environment.

The industrial democracies together account for 65 percent of the world's production and 70 percent of its commerce. Our economic performance drives international trade and finance. Our investment, technology, managerial expertise, and agricultural productivity are the spur to development and well-being around the world. Our enormous capacities are multiplied if we coordinate our policies and efforts.

The core of our strength is the vitality and growth of our own economies. At the Rambouillet economic summit last November, at the Puerto Rico summit next week, in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and in many other forums, the major democratic nations have shown their ability to work together. But an extensive agenda still summons us. We will require further efforts to continue our recovery and promote noninflationary growth. We will need to facilitate adequate investment and supplies of raw materials. We must continue to avoid protectionist measures, and we must use the opportunity of the multilateral trade negotiations to strengthen and expand the international trading system. We need to reduce our vulnerability and dependence on imported oil through conservation, new sources of energy, and collective preparations for possible emergencies. And we must build on the progress made at Rambouillet and at Jamaica last January to improve the international monetary system.

Our central challenge is to pool our strengths, to increase our coordination, and to tailor our policies to the long term. On the basis of solid cooperation among ourselves, we must deal more effectively with the challenges of the global economy—such as our economic relations with the centrally planned Communist economies and with the scores of new nations concerned with development.

East-West economic interchange, while small in relative scale, is becoming an important economic and political factor. This growth reflects our fundamental strength. It carries risks and complications, both political and economic. But it also presents opportunities for stabilizing relations and involving the Communist countries in responsible international conduct. If the democracies pursue parallel policies—not allowing the Communist states to stimulate debilitating competition among us or to manipulate the process for their own unilateral advantage—East-West economic relations can be a factor for peace and well-being.

We must insure that benefits are reciprocal. We must avoid large trade imbalances which could open opportunities for political pressure. We should structure economic relations so that the Communist states will be drawn into the international economic system and accept its disciplines. When dealing with centrally controlled state economies, we have to realize that economic relations have a high degree of political content and cannot be conducted solely on the normal commercial basis. Obviously, profitability must be one standard. But we need a broader strategy, consistent with our free enterprise system, so that economic relations will contribute to political objectives. The industrial democracies should coordinate their policies to insure the orderly and beneficial evolution of East-West relations. To these ends the United States has proposed to the OECD that we intensify our analyses of the problems and opportunities inherent in East-West trade with a view to charting common objectives and approaches.

If the economic strength of the industrial democracies is important to the Socialist countries, it is vital for the developing world. These nations seek to overcome pervasive poverty and to lift the horizons of their peoples: They ask for an equitable share of global economic benefits and a greater role in international decisions that affect them.

The process of development is crucial not only for the poorer nations but for the industrial nations as well. Our own prosperity is closely linked to the raw materials, the markets, and the aspirations of the developing countries. An international order can be stable only if all nations perceive it as fundamentally just and are convinced that they have a stake in it. Over the long term, cooperative North-South relations are thus clearly in the interest of all, and the objectives of industrial and developing countries should be complementary.

However, the North-South dialogue has been far from smooth. Tactics of pressure and an emphasis on rhetorical victories at conferences have too often created an atmosphere of confrontation. Such attitudes obscure the fundamental reality that development is an arduous long-term enterprise. It will go forward only if both sides face facts without illusions, shunning both confrontation and sentimentality.

Far more is involved than the mechanical application of technology and capital to poverty. There must be within the developing country a sense of purpose and direction, determined leadership and, perhaps most important, an impulse for change among the people. Development requires national administration, a complex infrastructure, a revised system of education, and many other social reforms. It is a profoundly unsettling process that takes decades. For many new countries it is in fact even more difficult than similar efforts by the Western countries a century ago, for their social and geographic conditions reflect the arbitrary subdivisions of colonial rule. Some face obstacles which could not be surmounted even with the greatest exertions on their own. Their progress depends on how well the international community responds to the imperatives of economic interdependence.

It is senseless, therefore, to pretend that development can proceed by quick fixes or oneshot solutions. Artificial majorities at international conferences confuse the issue. Confrontational tactics will in time destroy the domestic support in the industrial countries for the forward-looking policy which the developing countries so desperately need.

The industrial democracies have special responsibilities as well. Development requires their sustained and collective cooperation. They represent the largest markets and most of the world's technology and capital. They have an obligation to show understanding for the plight of the poorest and the striving for progress of all developing nations. But they do the developing countries no favor if they contribute to escapism. If they compete to curry favor over essentially propagandistic issues, contributions will be diluted, resources will go unallocated, and unworkable projects will be encouraged.

The developing countries need from us not a sense of guilt but intelligent and realistic proposals that merge the interests of both sides in an expanding world economy:

First, we must develop further the mechanisms of our own cooperation. To this end the United States has made a number of concrete proposals at the recently concluded OECD meeting.

Second, the industrial democracies should coordinate their national aid programs better so that we use our respective areas of experience and technical skill to best advantage. President Giscard's proposal for an integrated Western fund for Africa is an imaginative approach to regional development.

Third, we should regularly consult and work in close parallel in major international negotiations and conferences. The Conference on International Economic Cooperation, the multilateral trade negotiations, U.N. General Assembly special sessions, world conferences on food, population, environment or housing, and UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development] all can achieve much more if the industrial democracies approach them with a clear and coherent purpose.

Fourth, we should stop conducting all negotiations on an agenda not our own. We should not hesitate to put forward our own solutions to common problems.

Finally, we need a clear, longer term strategy for development. The diverse elements of the process, including various forms of assistance, technology transfer, trade and financial policy, must be better integrated.

Cooperation among developed countries is not confrontation between North and South, as is often alleged. The fact is that a responsible development policy is possible only if the industrial democracies pursue realistic goals with conviction, compassion, and coordination. They must not delude themselves or their interlocutors by easy panaceas, or mistake slogans for progress. We make the greatest contribution to development if we insist that the North-South dialogue emphasize substance rather than ideology, and concentrate on practical programs instead of empty theological debates.

# Future of Democratic Societies

In every dimension of our activities, then, the industrial democracies enter the new era with substantial capacities and opportunities. At the same time, it would be idle to deny that in recent years the moral stamina of the West has been seriously challenged.

Since its beginnings, Western civilization has clearly defined the individual's relationship to society and the state. In southern Europe the humanism of the Renaissance made man the measure of all things. In northern Europe the Reformation, in proclaiming the priesthood of all believers and offering rewards for individual effort, put the emphasis on the individual. In England the sense of justice and human rights and responsibilities evolved in the elaboration of the common law. Two hundred years ago the authors of our Declaration of Independence drew upon this heritage; to them every human being had inalienable rights to personal institutions?
Will skepticism and cynicism sap the spiritual energies of our civilization at the moment of its greatest technical and material success?
Having debunked authority, will our societies now seek refuge in false simplifications, demogogic certitudes, or extremist panaceas?

These questions are not a prediction but a test—a test of the creativity and moral fortitude of our peoples and leaders.

And yet Europe at that very moment was already well launched on one of the world's periods of greatest political and intellectual advance. The Renaissance and Reformation, the great discoveries, the revival of humanistic values, the industrial and democratic revolutions—these were all to create the character and the dynamism of the

life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The state existed to protect the individual and permit full scope for the enjoyment of these rights.

Today in the West, 30 years after the Marshall plan, our deepest challenge is that a new generation must explore again the issues of liberty and social responsibility in an era when societies have grown vastly in size, complexity, and dynamism. The modern industrial society, though founded in freedom and offering prosperity, risks losing the individual in the mass and fostering his alienation. The technical complexity of public issues challenges the functioning of democracy. Mass media and the weakening of party and group structures further the isolation of the individual; they transform democratic politics, adding new elements of volatility and unpredictability. The bureaucratic state poses a fundamental challenge to political leadership and responsiveness to public will.

Basic moral questions are raised:

• How do we inspire a questioning new generation in a relativist age and in a society of impersonal institutions? Western civilization of which we, on both sides of the Atlantic, are the heirs.

Similarly today, the West has assets to meet its challenges and to draw from them the material for new acts of creation. It is our nations that have been the vanguard of the modern age. Intellectually and morally, it is our societies that have proven themselves the vast laboratory of the experiment of modernization. Above all, it is the Western democracies that originated—and keep alive today—the vision of political freedom, social justice, and economic well-being for all peoples. None of us lives up to this vision ideally, or all the time. But the rigorous standard by which we judge ourselves is what makes us different from totalitarian societies of the left or the right.

This, then, is our moral task:

First, as democratic governments we must redeem, over and over again, the trust of our peoples. As a nation which has accepted the burden of leadership, the United States has a special responsibility: We must overcome the traumas of the recent period, eradicate their causes, and preserve the qualities which world leadership demands. In Europe wherever there has been a slackening in governmental responsiveness to the needs of citizens, there should be reform and revival.

Second, we must confront the complexities of a pluralistic world. This calls for more than specific technical solutions. It requires of leaders a willingness to explain the real alternatives, no matter how complicated or difficult. And it requires of electorates an understanding that we must make choices amidst uncertainty, where the outcome may be neither immediate nor reducible to simple slogans.

Third, we must clarify our attitudes toward political forces within Western societies which appeal to electorates on the ground that they may bring greater efficiency to government. But we cannot avoid the question of the commitment of these forces to democratic values, nor a concern about the trends that a decision based on temporary convenience would set in motion. At the same time, opposition to these forces is clearly not enough. There must be a response to legitimate social and economic aspirations and to the need for reforms of inadequacies from which these forces derive much of their appeal.

Finally, the solidarity of the democratic nations in the world is essential both as material support and as a moral symbol. There could be no greater inspiration of our peoples than the reaffirmation of their common purpose and the conviction that they can shape their fortune in freedom.

We cannot afford either a perilous complacency or immobilizing pessimism. Alastair Buchan posed his questions not to induce paralysis but as a spur to wiser action and fresh achievement.

We know what we must do. We also know what we can do. It only remains to do it.

# DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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FOR SIPRS; DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR MR. SCONCROPT AND WHITE HOUSE FOR MR' NESSEN USINFO FOR IPS/PA, IBS/PA, IAA E.0.11652: N/A TAGS: OVIR. (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) SUBJECT: SECVISIT: SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT HEREWITH SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT HOTEL KILIMANJARO, DAR ES SALAAM, SEPTEMBER 14, 1975 (NOTE STTEMENT MADE AT HOTEL, NOT RAY NOT AT AIRPORTS: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN: I HAVE COME HERE AT THE DIRECTION OF PRESIDEN NYERERE ABOUT THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, THIS INITIATIVE STARTED AT THE REQUEST OF AFRICAN LEADERS. DURING MY VISIT IN APRIL. EVERY STEP THAT HAS BROUGHT US HERE HAS BEEN CAREFULLY DISCUSSED WITH LEADERS IN AFRICA AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS, EVERY STEP WE WILL TAKE IN THE FUTURE WILL BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS. THE UNITED STATES WANTS NOTHING FOR ITSELF EXCEPT ITS INTEREST IN PEACE AND IN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS. THE CONFLICT THAT WE ARE TRYING TO END IS A CONFLICT WHICH WILL AFFECT MOST OF ALL THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA. THE PEOGRESS WE ARE TRYING TO BRING WILL BENEFIT ABOVE ALL THE PEOPLES OF AFRICA, WE WILL DO WHAT WE ARE ASKED TO DO, WE WILL DO NOTHING THAT IS NOT REQUESTED, WE WILL TAKE NO INITIATIVES THAT ARE NOT INVITED AND WHATEVER PROGRESS WILL OCCUR DEPENDS ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES AND THE GOODWILL OF THE PARTICIPANTS. WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE THE EFFORT THAT IS ENCOURAGED, AND IN THIS SPIRIT I LOOK FORWARD VERY MUCH TO MY TALKS WITH THE

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DISTINGUISHED LEADER OF THIS COUNTRY, PRESIDENT NYERERE, WITH WHOM WE HAVE HAD CLOSE COMMUNICATIONS OVER THE RECENT MONTHS AND WHO HAS ENCOURAGED US IN OUR ENTECPRISE, THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

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# Speech

September 30, 1976 United Nations, N.Y. Bureau of Public Affairs Office of Media Services

## TOWARD A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF COMMUNITY

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the 31st Session of the U.N. General Assembly.

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, Foreign Ministers, distinguished delegates:

Let me first congratulate this body for electing Ambassador [Hamilton Shirley] Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka to preside over this 31st Session of the General Assembly. He is a diplomat of great international stature who, among his many distinctions, has provided indispensable leadership to the crucial negotiations on the Law of the Sea.

I would also like to pay tribute to the Secretary General [Kurt Waldheim] for his tireless efforts on behalf of the world community. He successfully embodies the charter's principles of fairness, impartiality, and dedication to the causes of global peace and human dignity.

The United Nations was born of the conviction that peace is both indivisible and more than mere stability; that for peace to be lasting it must fulfill mankind's aspirations for justice, freedom, economic well-being, the rule of law, and the promotion of human rights. But the history of this organization has been in considerable measure the gradual awareness that humanity would not inevitably share a single approach to these goals.

The United Nations has survived—and helped to manage—30 years of vast change in the international system. It has come through the bitterness of the cold war. It has played a vital role in the dismantling of the colonial empires. It has helped moderate conflicts and is manning truce lines in critical parts of the world. It has carried out unprecedented efforts in such areas as public health, development assistance, and technical cooperation. But the most important challenge of this organization lies still ahead: To vindicate mankind's positive and nobler goals and help nations achieve a new understanding of community.

With modern communications, human endeavor has become a single experience for peoples in every part of the planet. We share the wonders of science and technology, the trials of industrialization and social change, and a constant awareness of the fate and dreams of our fellow men.

The world has shrunk, but the nations of the world have not come closer together. Paradoxically nationalism has been on the rise at the precise time when the most serious issues we all face can only be resolved through a recognition of our interdependence. The moral and political cohesion of our world may be eroding just when a sense of community has become indispensable.

Fragmentation has affected even this body. Nations have taken decisions on a bloc or regional basis by rigid ideologies, before even listening to the debate in these halls; on many issues positions have been predetermined by prior conferences containing more than half the membership of the United Nations. The tendency is widespread to come here for battle rather than negotiation. If these trends continue, the hope for world community will dissipate and the moral influence of this organization will progressively diminish.

This would be a tragedy. Members of this organization are today engaged in a multiplicity of endeavors to find just solutions for complex and explosive problems. There is a fragile tranquility, but beneath the surface it is challenged by fundamental forces of change-technological, economic, social. More than ever this is a time for statecraft and restraint, for persistence but also daring in the pursuit of peace and justice. The dogmas of perpetual strife produce only bloodshed and bitterness: They unleash the forces of destruction and repression and plant the seeds of future conflict. Appeals to hatred-whether on the basis of race or class or color or nationality or ideology-will, in the end, rebound against those who launch them and will not advance the cause of freedom and justice in the world.

Let us never forget that the United Nations benefits the smaller and weaker nations most of all. It is they that would suffer most from its failure. For without the rule of law, disputes will be settled as they have been all too frequently and painfully in history-by test of strength, it is not the weak that will prevail in the world of chaos.

The United States believes that this 31st General Assembly must free itself of the ideological and confrontational tactics that marked some of its predecessors and dedicate itself to a program of common action.

The United States comes to the General Assembly prepared to work on programs of common action. We will offer concrete proposals. We will listen to the ideas of others. We will resist pressure and seek cooperation.

Let me now discuss the three principal challenges we face-the problem of peace, the challenge of economic well-being, and the agenda of global interdependence.

## The Problem of Peace

The age of the United Nations has also been an age of frequent conflict. We have been spared a third world was but cannot assume that this condition will prevail forever, or without exertion. An era of thermonuclear weapons and persistent national rivalries requires our utmost effort to keep at bay the scourge of war. Our generation must build out of the multitude of nations a structure of relations that frees the energies of nations and peoples for the positive endeavors of mankind, without the fear or threat of war.

Central to American foreign policy are our sister democracies-the industrial nations of North America, Western Europe, the southern Pacific and Japan, and our traditional friends in the Western Hemisphere. We are bound to these nations by the ties of history, civilization, culture, shared principles, and a generation of common endeavors.

Our alliances, founded on the bedrock of mutual security, now reach beyond the common defense to a range of new issues: The social challenges shared by advanced technological societies. common approaches to easing tensions with our adversaries, and shaping positive relations with the developing world. The common efforts of the industrial democracies are not directed at exclusive ends but as a bridge to a broader, more secure, and cooperative international system and to increasing freedom and prosperity for all nations.

The United States is proud of its historical friendships in the Western Hemisphere. In the modern era they must be-and are-based on equality and mutual benefit. We have a unique advantage: The great dialogue between the developed and developing nations can find its most creative solution in the hemisphere where modern democracy was born and where cooperation between developed and developing, large and small, is a longstanding tradition.

Throughout history, ideology and power have tempted nations to seek unilateral advantage. But the inescapable lesson of the nuclear age is that the politics of tests of strength has become incompatible with the survival of humanity. Traditional power politics becomes irrational when war can destroy civilized life and neither side can gain a decisive strategic advantage.

Accordingly the great nuclear powers have particular responsibilities for restraint and vision. They are in a position to know the full extent of the catastrophe which could overwhelm mankind. They must take care not to fuel disputes if they conduct their rivalries by traditional methods. If they turn local conflicts into aspects of a global competition, sooner or later their competition will get out of control.

The United States believes that the future of mankind requires coexistence with the Soviet Union. Tired slogans cannot obscure the necessity for a more constructive relationship. We will insist that restraint be reciprocal, not just in bilateral relations but around the globe. There can be no selective detente. We will maintain our defenses and our vigilance. But we know that tough rhetoric is not strength; that we owe future generations more hopeful prospects than a delicate equilibrium of awesome forces.

Peace requires a balance of strategic power. This the United States will maintain. But the United States is convinced that the goal of strategic balance is achievable more safely by agreement than through an arms race. The negotiations on the limitation of armaments are, therefore, at the heart of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Unprecedented agreements limiting and controlling nuclear weapons have been reached. An historical effort is being made to place a ceiling on the strategic arsenals of both sides in accordance with the Vladivostok accord. And once this is achieved we are ready to seek immediately to lower the levels of strategic arms.

The United States welcomes the recent progress that has been made in further curtailing nuclear weapons testing and in establishing a regime for peaceful nuclear explosions for the first time. The two treaties now signed and awaiting ratification should be the basis for further progress in this field.

Together with several of our European allies, we are continuing efforts to achieve a balanced reduction in the military forces facing each other in central Europe. In some respects this is the most complex negotiation on arms limitation yet undertaken. It is our hope that, through patient effort, reciprocal reductions will soon be achieved that enhance the security of all countries involved.

The United States remains committed to the work of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. We welcome the progress there on banning environmental modification for destructive purposes. We will seriously examine all ideas-of whatever origin-to reduce the burdens of armaments. We will advance our own initiatives not for purposes of propaganda or unilateral advantage but to promote peace and security for all.

But coexistence and negotiations on the control of arms do not take place in a vacuum. We have been disturbed by the continuing accumulation of armaments and by recent instances of military intervention to tip the scales in local conflicts on distant continents. We have noted crude attempts to distort the purposes of diplomacy and to impede hopeful progress toward peaceful solutions to complex issues. These efforts only foster tensions; they cannot be reconciled with the policy of improving relations.

And they will inevitably be resisted. For coexistence to be something better than an uneasy armistice, both sides must recognize that ideology and power politics today confront the realities of

We came together out of necessity and a mutual belief that the world should remain free of military blackmail and the will to hegemony. We have set out a new path-in wide-ranging consultations, bilateral exchanges, the opening of offices in our respective capitals, and an accelerating movement toward normalization. And we have derived reciprocal benefits--a clear understanding of the aspirations of our peoples, better prospects for international equilibrium, reduced tensions in Asia, and increased opportunities for parallel actions on global issues.

These elements form the basis for a growing and lasting relationship founded on objective common interests. The United States is committed to strengthen the bonds between us and to proceed toward the normalization of our relations in strict conformity with the principles of the Shanghai Communique. As this process moves forward each side must display restraint and respect for the interests and convictions of the other. We will keep Chinese interests in mind on all international issues and will do our utmost to take account of them. But if the relationship is to prosper, there must be similar sensitivity to our views and concerns. On this basis the progressive development of

our relations with the world's most populous nation will be a key element of the foreign policy of the United States. The world today is witness to continuing

regional crises. Any one of them could blossom into larger conflict. Each one commands our most diligent efforts of conciliation and cooperation. The United States has played, and is prepared to continue to play, an active role in the search for peace in many areas-southern Africa, the Middle East, Korea, and Cyprus.

Racial injustice and the grudging retreat of colonial power have conspired to make southern Africa an acid test of the world's hope for peace and justice under the charter. A host of voices has been heard in this chamber warning that if we failed quickly to find solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rhodesia, that part of the globe could

the nuclear age and that a striving for unilateral advantages will not be accepted.

In recent years the new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China has held great significance for global security.

become a vicious battleground with consequences for every part of the world.

I have just been to Africa at President Ford's request to see what we could do to help the peoples of that continent achieve their aspirations to freedom and justice.

An opportunity to pull back from the brink now exists. I believe that Africa has before it the prize for which it has struggled for so long-the opportunity for Africans to shape a future of peace, justice, racial harmony, and progress.

The United Nations, since its inception, has been concerned with the issue of Namibia. For 30 years that territory has been a test of this institutions's ability to make its decisions effective.

In recent months the United States has vigorously sought to help the parties concerned speed up the process toward Namibian independence. The United States favors the following elements: The independence of Namibia with a fixed, short, time limit; the calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under U.N. aegis; and the participation in that conference of all authentic national forces including specifically SWAPO [South-West Africa People's Organization]. Progress has been made in achieving all of these goals. We will exert our efforts to remove the remaining obstacles and bring into being a conference which can then fashion, with good will and wisdom, a design for the new state of Namibia and its relationship with its neighbors. We pledge our continued solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a proud achievement of this organization and a symbol of international cooperation.

Less than a week ago the Rhodesian authorities announced that they are prepared to meet with the nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe to form an interim government to bring about majority rule within two years. This is in itself an historical break from the past. The African Presidents, in calling for immediate negotiations, have shown that they are prepared to seize this opportunity for a settlement. And the Government of the United Kingdom, in expressing its willingness to assemble a conference, has shown its high sense of responsibility and concern for the rapid and just independence of Rhodesia.

Inevitably after a decade of strife, suspicions run deep. Many obstacles remain. Magnanimity is never easy and less so after a generation of bitterness and racial conflict. But let us not lose sight of what has been achieved: A commitment to majority rule within two years; a commitment to form immediately a transitional government with an African majority in the cabinet and an African prime minister; a readiness to follow this with a constitutional conference to define the legal framework of an independent Zimbabwe.

The United States, together with other countries, has made major efforts, and we will continue to do what we can to support the hopeful process that is now possible. But it is those in Africa who must shape the future. The people of Rhodesia, and the neighboring states, now face a supreme challenge. Their ability to work together, their capacity to unify, will be tested in the months ahead as never before.

There may be some countries who see a chance for advantage in fueling the flames of war and racial hatred. But they are not motivated by concern for the peoples of Africa, or for peace. And if they succeed they could doom opportunities that might never return.

In South Africa itself, the pace of change accelerates. The system of apartheid, by whatever name, is a denial of our common humanity and a challenge to the conscience of mankind. Change is inevitable. The leaders of South Africa have shown wisdom in facilitating a peaceful solution in Rhodesia. The world community takes note of it and urges the same wisdom-while there is still time-to bring racial justice to South Africa.

As for the United States, we have become convinced that our values and our interests are best served by an Africa seeking its own destiny free of outside intervention. Therefore, we will back no faction whether in Rhodesia or elsewhere. We will not seek to impose solutions anywhere. The leadership and the future of an independent Zimbabwe, as for the rest of Africa, are for Africans to decide. The United States will abide by their decision. We call on all other non-African states to do likewise.

The United States wants no special position or sphere of influence. We respect African unity. The rivalry and interference of non-African powers would make a mockery of Africa's hard-won struggle for independence from foreign domination. It will inevitably be resisted. And it is a direct challenge to the most fundamental principles upon which the United Nations is founded.

Every nation that has signed the charter is

pledged to allow the nations of Africa-whose peoples have suffered so much-to fulfill at long last their dreams of independence, peace, unity, and human dignity in their own way and by their own decisions.

The United Nations, since its birth, has been involved in the chronic conflict in the Middle East. Each successive war has brought greater perils, an increased danger of great power confrontation, and more severe global economic dislocations.

At the request of the parties, the United States has been actively engaged in the search for peace in the Middle East. Since the 1973 war, statesmanship on all sides has produced unprecedented steps toward a resolution of this bitter conflict. There have been three agreements that lessen the danger of war; and mutual commitments have been made to pursue the negotiating process with urgency until a final peace is achieved. As a result, we are closer to the goal of peace than at any time in a generation.

The role of the United Nations has been crucial. The Geneva conference met in 1973 under its aegis, and the implementation of subsequent agreements has been negotiated in its working groups. Security Council resolutions form the only agreed framework for negotiations. The U.N. Emergency Force, Disengagement Observer Force, and Truce Supervision Organization are even now helping maintain peace on the truce lines. I want to compliment the Secretary General and his colleagues in New York, Geneva, and on the ground in the Middle East for their vigorous support of the peace process at critical moments.

well known. We have called for a resumption of a serious dialogue between North and South Korea. We have urged wider negotiations to promote security and reduce tensions. We are prepared to The United States remains committed to help have the U.N. Command dissolved so long as the the parties reach a settlement. The step-by-step armistice agreement-which is the only existing negotiations of the past three years have now brought us to a point where comprehensive solulegal arrangement committing the parties to keep the peace-is either preserved or replaced by more tions seem possible. The decision before us now is durable arrangements. We are willing to improve how the next phase of negotiations should be relations with North Korea, provided that its allies launched. The United States is prepared to participate in are ready to take similar steps toward the Republic of Korea. We are ready to talk with North Korea about the peninsula's future, but we will not do so without the participation of the Republic of Korea.

an early resumption of the work of the Geneva conference. We think a preparatory conference might be useful for a discussion of the structure of future negotiations, but we are open to other suggestions. Whatever steps are taken must be carefully prepared so that once the process begins the nations concerned will advance steadily toward agreement.

The groundwork that has been laid represents

an historic opportunity. The United States will do all it can to assure that by the time this Assembly meets next year it will be possible to report significant further progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Since the General Assembly last met, overwhelming tragedy has befallen the people of Lebanon. The United States strongly supports the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of that troubled country. We oppose partition. We hope that Lebanese affairs will soon be returned to the hands of the people of Lebanon. All members of the United Nations, and all the conflicting parties in Lebanon, have an obligation to support the efforts of the new President of Lebanon to restore peace and to turn energies to rebuilding the nation. And the agencies of the U.N. system can play an important role in the reconstruction effort.

We and many other U.N. members welcome the fact that a contentious and sterile debate on Korea will be avoided this fall. Let this opportunity be used, then, to address the central problem of how the Korean people can determine their future and achieve their ultimate goal of peaceful reunification without a renewal of armed conflict. Our own views on the problem of Korea are

The confrontation between North and South Korea remains a threat to international peace and stability. The vital interests of world powers intersect in Korea; conflict there inevitably threatens wider war.

Last fall the United States proposed a conference including all the parties most directly concerned-North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China-to discuss ways of adapting the armistice agreement to new

conditions and replacing it with more permanent arrangements. On July 22, I stated our readiness to meet immediately with these parties to consider the appropriate venue for such a conference. I reaffirm that readiness here today.

If such a conference proves impracticable right now, the United States would support a phased approach. Preliminary talks between North and South Korea, including discussions on the venue and scope of the conferences, could start immediately. In this phase the United States and the People's Republic of China could participate as observers or in an advisory role. If such discussions yielded concrete results, the United States and China could join the talks formally. This, in turn, could set the stage for a wider conference in which other countries could associate themselves with arrangements that guarantee a durable peace on the peninsula.

We hope that North Korea and other concerned parties will respond affirmatively to this proposed procedure or offer a constructive alternative suggestion.

The world community is deeply concerned over the continuing stalemate on the Cyprus problem.

Domestic pressures, nationalistic objectives, and international rivalries have combined to block the parties from taking even the most elementary steps toward a solution. On those few occasions when representatives of the two Cypriot communities have come together, they have fallen into inconclusive procedural disputes. The passage of time has served only to complicate domestic difficulties and to diminish the possibilities for constructive conciliation. The danger of conflict between Greece and Turkey has spread to other issues, as we have recently seen in the Aegean.

All concerned need to focus on committing themselves to achieve the overriding objectives assuring the well-being of the suffering Cypriot people and peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

A settlement must come from the Cypriot communities themselves. It is they who must decide how their island's economy, society, and government shall be reconstructed. It is they who must decide the ultimate relationship of the two communities and the territorial extent of each area.

The United States is ready to assist in restoring momentum to the negotiating process. We believe that agreeing to a set of principles might help the parties to resume negotiations. We would suggest some concepts along the following lines:

• A settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

• The present dividing lines on Cyprus must be adjusted to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side;

• The territorial arrangement should take into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees;

• A constitutional arrangement should provide conditions under which the two Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs; and

• Security arrangements should be agreed to that permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement.

I have discussed this approach with the Secretary General and with several Western European leaders. In the days ahead the United States will consult along these lines with all interested parties. In the meantime we urge the Secretary General to continue his dedicated efforts.

#### **Economic Development and Progress**

The economic division of our planet between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, between the industrial and developing nations, is a dominant issue of our time. Our mutual dependence for our prosperity is a reality, not a slogan. It should summon our best efforts to make common progress. We must commit ourselves to bring mankind's dreams of a better life to closer reality in our lifetime.

There are many reasons why cooperation has not made greater strides.

• The industrial democracies have sometimes been more willing to pay lip service to the challenge of development than to match rhetoric with real resources.

• The oil-producing nations command great wealth, and some have been generous in their contribution to international development. But the overall performance in putting that wealth to positive uses has been inadequate to the challenge. • The countries with nonmarket economies are quite prepared to undertake verbal assaults, but their performance is in inverse ratio to their rhetoric. Their real contribution to development assistance has been minimal. Last year, for example, the nonmarket economies provided only about four percent of the public aid flowing to the developing nations.

• The developing nations are understandably frustrated and impatient with poverty, illiteracy, and disease. But too often they have made demands for change that are as confrontational as they are unrealistic. They sometimes speak of new economic orders as if growth were a quick fix requiring only that the world's wealth be properly redistributed through tests of strength instead of a process of self-help over generations. Ultimately such tactics lose more than they gain, for they undermine the popular support in the industrial democracies which is imperative to provide the resources and market access-available nowhere else-to sustain development.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear—a rapid rise in the incomes of their people; a greater role in the international decisions which affect them; and fair access to the world's economic opportunities.

The objectives of the industrial nations are equally plain—an efficient and open system of world trade and investment; expanding opportunities and production for both North and South; the reliable and equitable development of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw materials; a world economy in which prosperity is as close to universal as our imagination and our energies allow.

These goals are complementary. Indeed they must be, for neither side can achieve its aims at the expense of the other. They can be realized only through cooperation.

We took a major step forward together a year ago, at the Seventh Special Session of this Assembly. And we have since followed through on many fronts.

• We have taken steps to protect the economic security of developing nations against cyclical financial disaster. The newly expanded compensatory finance facility of the International Monetary Fund has disbursed over \$2 billion to developing nations this year alone. pFDpvmmappsm jisocl gT in

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• An IMF Trust Fund, financed by gold sales, has been established for the benefit of the low-income countries.

• Replenishments for the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank will provide additional resources for development.

• Worldwide food aid has expanded. We have committed ourselves to expand the world supply of food. With a U.S. contribution of \$200 million, we have brought the International Fund for Agricultural Development close to operation.

• The major industrial nations have moved to expand trade opportunities for the developing world. We have joined in a solemn pledge to complete by next year the liberalization of world trade through the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations. For its part, the United States has established a system of generalized preferences which has stimulated billions in exports from developing nations to the United States in 1975.

The United States continued this process by putting forward a number of new proposals at the Fourth Ministerial U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in May 1976. We proposed a comprehensive plan to improve the capacity of the developing countries to select, adapt, improve, and manage technology for development. We committed ourselves to improvements in the quality of aid, proposing that a greater proportion of aid to poor countries be on a grant basis and united to purchases from donor nations. We agreed to a serious effort to improve markets of 18 basic commodities.

These measures undertaken since we met here just a year ago assist—not with rhetoric and promises but in practical and concrete ways—the peoples of the world who are struggling to throw off the chains of poverty. Much remains to be done.

First, the application of science and technology is at the very heart of the development process. The United States, conscious of its pioneering role in technology, has put forward three basic principles, which we will support with funds and talent:

• To train individuals who can identify, select, and manage the future technology of the developing world;

• To build both national and international institutions to create indigenous technology, as well as adapt foreign designs and inventions; and • To spur the private sector to make its maximum contribution to the development and transfer of technological progress.

To achieve these goals, we are today extending an invitation to the World Conference on Science and Technology for Development, now scheduled for 1979, to meet in this country. In preparation for that meeting, we have asked members of the industrial, academic, and professional scientific communities throughout the United States to meet in Washington in November. They will review the important initiatives this country can take to expand the technological base for development, and they will strive to develop new approaches.

Second, the ministerial meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris should be given new impetus. We are making several new proposals:

• We will seek to help nations facing severe debt burdens. For acute cases we will propose guidelines for debt renegotiation. For countries facing longer term problems, we will propose systematic examination of remedial measures, including increased aid.

• We will advance new ideas for expanded cooperation in energy, including a regular process of information exchange among energy producers and users and an expanded transfer of energy-related technology to energy-poor developing nations.

Third, the industrial democracies have been far too willing to wait for the demands of the developing countries rather than to advance their own proposals. Now, however, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, at the suggestion of the United States, have agreed to examine long-range development planning and to develop a more coherent and comprehensive approach to global growth and economic justice.

Fourth, natural disaster each year takes thousands of lives and costs billions of dollars. It strikes most those who can afford it the least—the poorest peoples of the world. Its toll is magnified by a large array of global issues—overpopulation, food scarcity, damage to the ecology, and economic underdevelopment. The United Nations has a unique capacity to address these global concerns and thus improve man's odds against nature. We urge this body to take the lead in strengthening international cooperation to prevent and alleviate natural calamity.

Our dream is that all the children of the world can live with hope and widening opportunity. No nation can accomplish this alone; no group of nations can achieve it through confrontation. But together there is a chance for major progress—and in our generation.

## Interdependence and Community

It is an irony of our time that an age of ideological and nationalistic rivalry has spawned as well a host of challenges that no nation can possibly solve by itself.

• The proliferation of nuclear weapons capacities adds a new dimension of danger to political conflicts, regionally and globally.

• As technology opens up the oceans, conflicting national claims and interests threaten chaos.

• Man's inventiveness has developed the horrible new tool of terror that claims innocent victims on every continent.

• Human and civil rights are widely abused and have now become an accepted concern of the world community.

Let me set forth the U.S. position on these topics.

The growing danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons raises stark questions about man's ability to insure his very existence.

We have lived through three perilous decades in which the catastrophe of nuclear war has been avoided despite a strategic rivalry between a relatively few nations.

But now, a wholly new situation impends. Many nations have the potential to build nuclear weapons. If this potential were to materialize, threats to use nuclear weapons, fed by mutually reinforcing misconceptions, could become a recurrent feature of local conflicts in every quarter of the globe. And there will be growing dangers of accidents, blackmail, theft, and nuclear terrorism.

Unless current trends are altered rapidly, the likelihood of nuclear devastation could grow steadily in the years to come.

We must look first to the roots of the problem; • Since the 1973 energy crisis and drastic rise in oil prices, both developed and developing nations have seen in nuclear energy a means both of lowering the cost of electricity and of reducing reliance upon imported petroleum.

• In an age of growing nationalism some see the acquisition and expansion of nuclear power as symbols of enhanced national prestige. And it is also clear that some nations, in attaining this peaceful technology, may wish to provide for themselves a future option to acquire nuclear weapons.

A nation that acquires the potential for a nuclear weapons capability must accept the consequences of its action. It is bound to trigger offsetting actions by its neighbors and stimulate broader proliferation, thereby accelerating a process that ultimately will undermine its own security. And it is disingenuous to label as "peaceful" nuclear devices which palpably are capable of massive military destruction. The spread of nuclear reactor and fuel cycle capabilities, especially in the absence of evident economic need and combined with ambiguous political and military motives, threatens to proliferate nuclear weapons with all their dangers.

Time is of the essence. In no area of international concern does the future of this planet depend more directly upon what this generation elects to do—or fails to do. We must move on three broad fronts.

First, international safeguards must be strengthened and strictly enforced. The supply and use of nuclear materials associated with civilian nuclear energy programs must be carefully safeguarded so that they will not be diverted. Nuclear suppliers must impose the utmost restraint upon themselves and not permit the temptations of commercial advantage to override the risks of proliferation. The physical security of nuclear materialswhether in use, storage, or transfer-must be increased. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] must receive the full support of all nations in making its safeguards effective, reliable, and universally applicable. Any violator of the IAEA safeguards must face immediate and drastic penalties.

Second, adherence to safeguards, while of prime importance, is no guarantee against future proliferation. We must continue our efforts to forge international restraints against the acquisition or transfer of reprocessing facilities which produce separated plutonium and of enrichment facilities which produce highly enriched uranium—both of which are useable for the construction of nuclear weapons.

Third, we must recognize that one of the principal incentives for seeking sensitive reprocessing and enrichment technology is the fear that essential nonsensitive materials—notably reactorgrade uranium fuel—will not be made available on a reliable basis. Nations that show their sense of international responsibility by accepting effective restraints have a right to expect reliable and economical supply of peaceful nuclear reactors and associated nonsensitive fuel. The United States, as a principal supplier of these items, is prepared to be responsible in this regard.

In the near future, President Ford will announce a comprehensive American program for international action on nonproliferation that reconciles global aspirations for assured nuclear supply with global requirements for nuclear control.

We continue to approach the proliferation problem in full recognition of the responsibility that we and other nuclear powers have—both in limiting our weapons arsenals and in insuring that the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy can be made available to all states within a shared framework of effective international safeguards. In this way the atom can be seen once again as a boon and not a menace to mankind.

Another issue of vast global consequence is the Law of the Sea. The negotiations which have just recessed in New York represent one of the most important, complex, and ambitious diplomatic undertakings in history. Consider what is at stake.

• Mankind is attempting to devise an international regime for nearly three-quarters of the Earth's surface.

• Some 150 nations are participating, reflecting all the globe's diverse national perspectives, ideologies, and practical concerns.

• A broad sweep of vital issues is involved economic development, military security, freedom of navigation, crucial and dwindling living resources, the ocean's fragile ecology, marine scientific research, and vast potential mineral wealth. • The world community is aspiring to shape major new international legal principles—the extension of the long established territorial sea, the creation of a completely new concept of an economic zone extending 200 miles, and the designation of the deep seabed as the "common heritage of mankind."

We have traveled an extraordinary distance in these negotiations in recent years—thanks in no small part to the skill and dedication of the distinguished President of this Assembly. Agreement exists on key correpts—a 12-mile territorial sea, free passage over and through straits, a 200-mile economic zone, and important pollution controls. In many fields we have replaced ideological debates with serious efforts to find concrete solutions. And there is growing consensus that the outstanding problems must be solved at the next session.

But there is hardly room for complacency. Important issues remain which, if not settled, could cause us to forfeit all our hard-won progress. The conference has yet to agree on the balance between coastal state and international rights in the economic zone; on the freedom of marine scientific research; on arrangements for dispute settlement; and, most crucially, on the regime for exploitation of the deep seabeds.

The United States has made major proposals to resolve the deep seabed issue. We have agreed that the seabeds are the common heritage of all mankind. We have proposed a dual system for the exploitation of seabed minerals by which half of the mining sites would be reserved for the international authority and half could be developed by individual nations and their nationals on the basis of their technical capacity. We have offered to find financing and to transfer the technology neded to make international mining a practical reality. And in light of the many uncertainties that lie ahead, we have proposed that there be a review—for example, in 25 years—to determine whether the provisions on seabed mining are working equitably.

In response some nations have escalated both their demands and the stridency with which they advocate them.

I must say candidly that there are limits beyond which no American Administration can, or will, go. If attempts are made to compel concessions which exceed those limits, unilateralism will become inevitable. Countries which have no technological capacity for mining the seabeds in the foreseeable future should not seek to impose a doctrine of total internationalization on nations which alone have this capacity and which have voluntarily offered to share it. The United States has an interest in the progressive development of international law, stable order, and global cooperation. We are prepared to make sacrifices for thisbut they cannot go beyond equitable bounds.

Let us, therefore, put aside delaying tactics and pressures and take the path of coooperation. If we have the vision to conclude a treaty considered fair and just by mankind, our labors will have profound meaning not only for the regimen of the oceans but for all efforts to build a peaceful, cooperative, and prosperous international community. The United States will spend the interval between sessions of the conference reviewing its positions and will approach other nations well in advance of the next session at the political level to establish the best possible conditions for its success.

A generation that dreams of world peace and economic progress is plagued by a new, brutal, cowardly, and indiscriminate form of violence-international terrorism. Small groups have rejected the norms of civilized behavior and wantonly taken the lives of defenseless men, women, and children---innocent victims with no power to affect the course of events. In the year since I last addressed this body, there have been 11 hijackings, 19 kidnappings, 42 armed attacks, and 112 bombings perpetrated by international terrorists. Over 70 people have lost their lives and over 200 have been injured.

It is time this organization said to the world that the vicious murder and abuse of innocents cannot be absolved or excused by the invocation of lofty motives. Criminal acts against humanity, whatever the professed objective, cannot be excused by any civilized nation.

The threat of terrorism should be dealt with through the cooperative efforts of all countries. More stringent steps must be taken now to deny skyjackers and terrorists a safe haven.

Additional measures are required to protect passengers in both transit and terminal areas, as well as in flight.

The United States will work within the International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] to expand its present technical assistance to include the security of air carriers and terminal facilities. We urge the universal implementation of aviation security standards adopted by ICAO. We are prepared to assist the efforts of other governments to implement those standards.

The United States will support new initiatives which will insure the safety of the innocent. The proposal of the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, against the taking of hostages, deserves the most serious and sympathetic consideration of this Assembly.

The United States will do everything within its power to work cooperatively in the United Nations and in other international bodies to put an end to the scourge of terrorism. But we have an obligation to protect the lives of our citizens as they travel at home or abroad, and we intend to meet that obligation. Therefore, if multilateral efforts are blocked by those determined to pursue their ends without regard for suffering or death, then the United States will act through its own legislative processes and in conjunction with others willing to join us.

Terrorism is an international problem. It is inconceivable that an organization of the world's nations would fail to take effective action against it.

The final measure of all we do together, of course, is man himself. Our common efforts to define, preserve, and enhance respect for the rights of man thus represent an ultimate test of international cooperation.

We Americans, in the year of our Bicentennial, are conscious—and proud—of our own traditions. Our founders wrote 200 years ago of the equality and inalienable rights of all men. Since then the ideals of liberty and democracy have become the universal and indestructible goals of mankind.

But the plain truth-of tragic proportions-is that human rights are in jeopardy over most of the globe. Arbitrary arrest, denial of fundamental procedural rights, slave labor, stifling of freedom of religion, racial injustice, political repression, the use of torture, and restraints on communications and expression-these abuses are too prevalent.

The performance of the U.N. system in protecting human rights has fallen far short of what was envisaged when this organization was founded. The principles of the Universal Declaration are clear enough. But their invocation and application,

in general debates of this body and in the forums of the Human Rights Commission, have been marred by hypocrisy, double standards, and discrimination. Flagrant and consistent deprivation of human rights is no less heinous in one country or one social system than in another. Nor is it more acceptable when practiced upon members of the same race than when inflicted by one race upon another.

The international community has a unique role to play. The application of the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be entrusted to fair and capable international bodies. But at the same time let us insure that these bodies do not become platforms from which nations which are the worst transgressors pass hypocritical judgment on the alleged shortcomings.

Let us together pursue practical approaches:

• To build on the foundations already laid at previous assemblies and at the Human Rights Commission to lessen the abominable practice of officially sanctioned torture;

• To promote acceptance of procedures for protecting the rights of people subject to detention, such as access to courts, counsel, and families; prompt release or fair and public trial;

To improve the working procedures of international bodies concerned with human rights so that they may function fairly and effectively; and
To strengthen the capability of the United Nations to meet the tragic problems of the ever growing number of refugees whose human rights have been stripped away by conflict in almost every continent.

The United States pledges its firm support to these efforts.

### Conclusion

The challenge to statesmanship in this generation is to advance from the management of crises to the building of a more stable and just international order—an order resting not on power but on restraint of power, not on the strength of arms but on the strength of the human spirit.

Global forces of change now shape our future. Order will come in one of two ways: Through its imposition by the strong and the ruthless or by the wise and farsighted use of international institutions 12

through which we enlarge the sphere of common interests and enhance the sense of community.

It is easy and tempting to press relentlessly for national advantage. It is infinitely more difficult to act in recognition of the rights of others. Throughout history, the greatness of men and nations has been measured by their actions in times of acute peril. Today there is no single crisis to conquer. There is instead a persisting challenge of staggering complexity—the need to create a universal community based on cooperation, peace, and justice.

If we falter future generations will pay for our failure. If we succeed it will have been worthy of the hopes of mankind. I am confident that we can succeed.

And it is here, in the assembly of nations, that we should begin.

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER Secretary of State

BEFORE THE

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Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, Foreign Ministers, distinguished delegates:

Let me first congratulate this body for electing Ambassador Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka to preside over this Thirty-first session of the General Assembly. He is a diplomat of great international stature, who among his many distinctions, has provided indispensable leadership to the crucial negotiations on the Law of the Sea.

I would also like to pay tribute to the Secretary-General for his tireless efforts on behalf of the world community. He successfully embodies the charter's principles of fairness, impartiality and dedication to the causes of global peace and human dignity.

The United Nations was born of the conviction that peace is both indivisible and more than mere stability, that for peace to be lasting it must fulfill mankind's aspirations for justice, freedom, economic well-being, the rule of law and the promotion of human rights. But the history of this organization has been in considerable measure the gradual awareness that humanity would not inevitably share a single approach to these goals.

The United Nations has survived -- and helped to manage -- thirty years of vast change in the international system. It has come through the bitterness of the Cold War. It has played a vital role in the dismantling of the colonial empires. It has helped moderate conflicts, and is manning truce lines in critical parts of the world. It has carried our unprecedented efforts in such areas as public health, development assistance and technical cooperation.

But the most important challenge of this organization lies still ahead: to vindicate mankind's positive and nobler goals and help nations achieve a new understanding of community.

With modern communications, human endeavor has become a single experience for peoples in every part of the planet. We share the wonders of science and technology, the trials of industrialization and social change, and a constant awareness of the fate and dreams of our fellow men.

The world has shrunk, but the nations of the world have not come closer together. Paradoxically, nationalism has been on the rise at the precise time when the most serious issues we all face can only be resolved through a recognition of our interdependence. The moral and political cohesion of our world may be eroding just when a sense of community has become indispensable.

Fragmentation has affected even this body. Nations have taken decisions on a bloc or regional basis by rigid ideologies, before even listening to the debate in these halls; on many issues positions have been predetermined by prior conferences containing more than half the membership of the United Nations. The tendency is widespread to come here for battle rather than negotiation. If these trends continue, the hope for world community will dissipate and the moral influence of this organization will progressively diminish. This would be a tragedy. Members of this organization are today engaged in a multiplicity of endeavors to find just solutions for complex and explosive problems. There is a fragile tranquility but beneath the surface it is challenged by fundamental forces of change -- technological, economic, social. More than ever this is a time for statecraft and restraint, for persistence but also daring in the pursuit of peace and justice. The dogmas of perpetual strife produce only bloodshed and bitterness: they unleash the forces of destruction and repression and plant the seeds of future conflict. Appeals to hatred -- whether on the basis of race or class or color or nationality or ideology -will in the end rebound against those who launch them and will not advance the cause of freedom and justice in the world.

Let us never forget that the United Nations benefits the smaller and weaker nations most of all. It is they that would suffer most from its failure. For without the rule of law, disputes will be settled as they have been all too frequently and painfully in history -- by test of strength it is not the weak that will prevail in the world of chaos.

The United States believes that this Thirty-first General Assembly must free itself of the ideological and confrontational tactics that marked some of its predecessors and dedicate itself to a program of common action.

The United States comes to the General Assembly prepared to work on programs of common action. We will offer concrete proposals. We will listen to the ideas of others. We will resist pressure and seek cooperation.

Let me now discuss the three principal challenges we face -- the problem of peace, the challenge of economic well-being, and the agenda of global interdependence.

#### The Problem of Peace

The age of the United Nations has also been an age of frequent conflict. We have been spared a third world war, but cannot assume that this condition will prevail forever, or without exertion. An era of thermonuclear weapons and persistent national rivalries requires our utmost effort to keep at bay the scourge of war. Our generation must build out of the multitude of nations a structure of relations that frees the energies of nations and peoples for the positive endeavors of mankind, without the fear or threat of war.

Central to American foreign policy are our sister democracies -- the industrial nations of North America, Western Europe, the Southern Pacific and Japan, and our traditional friends in the Western Hemisphere. We are bound to these nations by the ties of history, civilization, culture, shared principles and a generation of common endeavors.

Our alliances, founded on the bedrock of mutual security, now reach beyond the common defense to a range of new issues: the social challenges shared by advanced technological societies; common approaches to easing tensions with our adversaries; and shaping positive relations with the developing world. The common efforts of the industrial democracies are not directed at exclusive ends but as a bridge to a broader, more secure and cooperative international system and to increasing freedom and prosperity for all nations.

The United States is proud of its historical friendships in the Western Hemisphere. In the modern era they must be -- and are -- based on equality and mutual benefit. We have a unique advantage: the great dialogue between the developed and the developing nations can find its most creative solution in the hemisphere where modern democracy was born, and where cooperation between developed and developing, large and small, is a long-standing tradition.

Throughout history, ideology and power have tempted nations to seek unilateral advantage. But the inescapable lesson of the nuclear age is that the politics of tests of strength has become incompatible with the survival of humanity. Traditional power politics becomes irrational when war can destroy civilized life and neither side can gain a decisive strategic advantage.

Accordingly, the great nuclear powers have particular responsibilities for restraint and vision. They are in a position to know the full extent of the catastrophe which could overwhelm mankind. They must take care not to fuel disputes if they conduct their rivalries by traditional methods. If they turn local conflicts into aspects of a global competition, sooner or later their competition will get out of control.

The United States believes that the future of mankind requires coexistence with the Soviet Union. Tired slogans cannot obscure the necessity for a more constructive relationship. We will insist that restraint be reciprocal not just in bilateral relations but around the globe. There can be no selective detente. We will maintain our defenses and our vigilance. But we know that tough rhetoric is not strength; that we owe future generations more hopeful prospects than a delicate equilibrium of awesome forces.

Peace requires a balance of strategic power. This the United States will maintain. But the United States is convinced that the goal of strategic balance is achievable more safely by agreement than through an arms race. The negotiations on the limitation of armaments are therefore at the heart of US/Soviet relations.

Unprecédented agreements limiting and controlling nuclear weapons have been reached. An historic effort is being made to place a ceiling on the strategic arsenals of both sides in accordance with the Vladivostok accord. And once this is achieved we are ready to seek immediately to lower the levels of strategic arms.

The United States welcomes the recent progress that has been made in further curtailing nuclear weapons testing and in establishing a regime for peaceful nuclear explosions for the first time. The two treaties now signed and awaiting ratification should be the basis for further progress in this field.

Together with several of our European allies, we are continuing efforts to achieve a balanced reduction in the military forces facing each other in Central Europe. In some respects this is the most complex

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negotiation on arms limitation yet undertaken. It is our hope that through patient effort reciprocal reductions will soon be achieved that enhance the security of all countries involved.

The United States remains committed to the work of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. We welcome the progress there on banning environmental modification for destructive purposes. We will seriously examine all ideas, of whatever origin, to reduce the burdens of armaments. We will advance our own initiatives not for purposes of propaganda or unilateral advantage but to promote peace and security for all.

But coexistence and negotiations on the control of arms do not take place in a vacuum. We have been disturbed by the continuing accumulation of armaments and by recent instances of military intervention to tip the scales in local conflicts on distant continents. We have noted crude attempts to distort the purposes of diplomacy and to impede hopeful progress toward peaceful solutions to complex issues. These efforts only foster tensions; they cannot be reconciled with the policy of improving relations.

And they will inevitably be resisted. For coexistence to be something better than an uneasy ármistice, both sides must recognize that ideology and power politics today confront the realities of the nuclear age and that a striving for unilateral advantages will not be accepted.

In recent years, the new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China has held great significance for global security.

We came together out of necessity and a mutual belief that the world should remain free of military blackmail and the will to hegemony. We have set out a new path -- in wide-ranging consultations, bilateral exchanges, the opening of offices in our respective capitals and an accelerating movement toward normalization. And we have derived reciprocal benefits -- a clear understanding of the aspirations of our peoples, better prospects for international equilibrium, reduced tensions in Asia and increased opportunities for parallel actions on global issues.

These elements form the basis for a growing and lasting relationship founded on objective common interests. The United States is committed to strengthen the bonds between us and to proceed toward the normalization of our relations in strict conformity with the principles of the Shanghai Communique. As this process moves forward each side must display restraint and respect for the interests and convictions of the other. We will keep Chinese interests in mind on all international issues and will do our utmost to take account of them. But if the relationship is to prosper, there must be similar sensitivity to our views and concerns.

On this basis, the progressive development of our relations with the world's most populous nation will be a key element of the foreign policy of the United States.

The world today is witness to continuing regional crises. Any one of them could blossom into larger conflict. Each one commands our most diligent efforts of conciliation and cooperation. The United States has played, and is prepared to continue to play, an active role in the search for peace in many areas: southern Africa, the Middlle East, Korea and Cyprus.

Racial injustice and the grudging retreat of colonial power have conspired to make southern Africa an acid test of the world's hope for peace and justice under the charter. A host of voices have been heard in this chamber warning that if we failed quickly to find solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rhodesia, that part of the globe could become a viscious battleground with consequences for every part of the world.

I have just been to Africa at President Ford's request, to see what we could do to help the peoples of that continent achieve their aspirations to freedom and justice.

An opportunity to pull back from the brink now exists. I believe that Africa has before it the prize for which it has struggled for so long -the opportunity for Africans to shape a future of peace, justice, racial harmony and progress.

The United Nations since its inception has been concerned with the issue of Namibia. For thirty years, that territory has been a test of this institution's ability to make its decisions effective.

In recent months, the United States has vigorously sought to help the parties concerened speed up the process toward Namibian independence. The United States favors the following elements: the independence of Namibia with a fixed, short, time limit; the calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under United Nations aegis; and the participation in that conference of all authentic national forces including specifically SWAPO. Progress has been made in achieving all of these goals. We will exert our efforts to remove the remaining obstacles and bring into being a conference which can then fashion, with good will and wisdom, a design for the new state of Namibia and its relationship with its neighbors. We pledge our continued solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a proud achievement of this organization and a symbol of international cooperation.

Less than a week ago the Rhodesian authorities announced that they are prepared to meet with the nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe to form an interim government to bring about majority rule within two years. This is in itself an historical break from the past. The African Presidents, in calling for immediate negotiations, have shown that they are prepared to seize this opportunity for a settlement. And the Government of the United Kingdom, in expressing its willingness to assemble a conference, has shown its high sense of responsibility and concern for the rapid and just independence of Rhodesia. Inevitably after a decade of strife, suspicions run deep. Many obstacles remain. Magnanimity is never easy, and less so after a generation of bitterness and racial conflict. But let us not lose sight of what has been achieved: a commitment to majority rule within two years; a commitment to formimmediately a transitional government with an African majority in the cabinet and an African prime minister; a readiness to follow this with a constitutional conference to define the legal framework of an independent Zimbabwe.

The United State, together with other countries, has made major efforts; and we will continue to do what we can to support the hopeful process that is now possible. But it is those in Africa who must shape the future. The people of Rhodesia, and the neighboring states, now face a supreme challenge. Their ability to work together, their capacity to unify will be tested in the months ahead as never before.

There may be some countries who see a chance for advantge in fueling the flames of war and racial hatred. But they are not motivated by concern for the peoples of Africa, or for peace. And if they succeed they could doom opportunities that might never return.

In South Africa itself, the pace of change accelerates. The system of apartheid, by whatever name, is a denial of our common humanity and a challenge to the conscience of mankind. Change is inevitable. The leaders of South Africa have shown wisdom in facilitating a peaceful solution in Rhodesia. The world community takes note of it, and urges the same wisdom -- while there is still time -- to bring racial justice to South Africa.

As for the United States, we have become convinced that our values and our interests are best served by an Africa seeking its own destiny free of outside intervention. Therefore, we will back no faction whether in Rhodesia or elsewhere. We will not seek to impose solutions anywhere. The leadership and the future of an independent Zimbabwe, as for the rest of Africa, are for Africans to decide. The United States will abide by their decision. We call on all other non-African states to do likewise.

The United States wants no special position or sphere of influence. We respect African unity. The rivalry and interference of non-African powers would make a mockery of Africa's hard-won struggle for independence from foreign domination. It will inevitably be resisted. And it is a direct challenge to the most fundamental principles upon which the United Nations is founded.

Every nation that has signed the Charter is pledged to allow the nations of Africa, whose peoples have suffered so much, to fulfill at long last their dreams of independence, peace, unity and human dignity in their own way and by their own decisions.

The United Nations, since its birth, has been involved in the chronic conflict in the Middle East. Each successive war has brought greater perils, an increased danger of great power confrontation and more severe global economic dislocations.

At the request of the parties, the United States has been actively engaged in the search for peace in the Middle East. Since the 1973 war, statesmanship on all sides has produced unprecedented steps toward a resolution of this bitter conflict. There have been three agreements that lessen the danger of war; and mutual commitments have been made to pursue the negotiating process with urgency until a final peace is achieved. As a result, we are closer to the goal of peace than any time in a generation.

The role of the United Nations has been crucial. The Geneva Conference met in 1973 under its aegis, and the implementation of subsequent agreements has been negotiated in its working groups. Security Council resolutions form the only agreed framework for negotiations. The UN Emergency Force, Disengagement Observer Force, and Truce Supervision Organization are even now helping maintain peace on the truce lines. I want to compliment the Secretary General and his colleagues in New York, Geneva, and on the ground in the Middle East, for their vigorous support of the peace process at critical moments.

The United States remains committed to help the parties reach a settlement. The step-by-step negotiations of the past three years have now brought us to a point where comprehensive solutions seem possible. The decision before us now is how the next phase of negotiations should be launched.

The United States is prepared to participate in an early resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference. We think a preparatory conference might be useful for a discussion of the structure of future negotiations,

but we are open to other suggestions. Whatever steps are taken must be carefully prepared so that once the process begins the nations concerned will advance steadily toward agreement.

The groundwork that has been laid represents an historic opportunity. The United States will do all it can to assure that by the time this Assembly meets next year it will be possible to report significant further progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Since the General Assembly last met, overwhelming tragedy has befallen the people of Lebanon. The United States strongly supports the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of that troubled country. We oppose partition. We hope that Lebanese affairs will soon be returned to the hands of the people of Lebanon. All members of the United Nations,and all the conflicting parties in Lebanon, have an obligation to support the efforts of the new President of Lebanon to restore peace and to turn energies to rebuilding the nation. And the agencies of the United Nations system can play an important role in the reconstruction effort.

The confrontation between North and South Korea remains a threat to international peace and stability. The vital interests of world powers intersect in Korea; conflict there inevitably threatens wider war.

We and many other UN members welcome the fact that a contentious and sterile debate on Korea will be avoided this fall. Let this opportunity be used, then, to address the central problem of how the Korean people can determine their future and achieve their ultimate goal of peaceful reunification without a renewal of armed conflict.

Our own views on the problem of Korea are well known. We have called for a resumption of a serious dialogue between North and South Korea. We have urged wider negotiations to promote security and reduce tensions. We are prepared to have the United Nations Command dissolved so long as the Armistice Agreement -- which is the only existing legal arrangmeent commiting the parties to keep the peace -- is either preserved or replaced by more durable arrangements. We are willing to improve relations with North Korea, provided that its allies are ready to take similar steps toward the Republic of Korea. We are ready to talk with North Korea about the Peninsula's future, but we will not do so without the participation of the Republic of Korea.

Last fall the United States proposed a conference including all the parties most directly concerned -- North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China -- to discuss ways of adapting the Armistice Agreement to new conditions and replacing it with more permanent arrangements. On July 22, I stated our readiness to meet immediately with these parties to consider the appropriate venue for such a conference. I reaffirm that readiness here today.

If such a conference proves impracticable right now, the United States would support a phased approach. Preliminary talks between North and South Korea, including discussions on the venue and scope of the con-

ference could start immeditely. In this phase the United States and the People's Republic of China could participate as observers or in an advisory role. If such discussions yielded concrete results, the United States and China could join the talks formally. This, in turn, could set the stage for a wider conference in which other countries could associate themselves with arrangements that guarantee a durable peace on the Peninsula.

We hope that North Korea and other concerned parties will respond affirmatively to this proposed procedure or offer a constructive alternative suggestion.

The world community is deeply concerned over the continuing stalemate on the Cyprus problem.

Domestic pressures, nationalistic objectives, and international rivalries have combined to block the parties from taking even the most elementary steps toward a solution. On those few occasions when representatives of the two Cypriot communities have come together, they have fallen into inconclusive procedural disputes. The passage of time has served only to complicate domestic difficulties and to diminish the possibilities for constructive conciliation. The danger of conflict between Greece and Turkey has spread to other issues, as we have recently seen in the Aegean.

All concerned need to focus on committing themselves to achieve the overriding objectives -- assuring the well-being of the suffering Cypriot people, and peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

A settlement must come from the Cypriot communities themselves. It is they who must decide how their island's economy, society, and government shall be recontructed. It is they who must decide the ultimate relationship of the two communities and the territorial extent of each area.

The United States is ready to assist in restoring momentum to the negotiating process. We believe that agreeing to a set of principles might help the parties to resume negotiations. We would suggest some concepts along the following lines:

-; a settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

-- the present dividing lines on Cyprus must be adjusted to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side;

-- the territorial arrangement should take into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees;

-- a constitutional arrangement should provide conditions under which the two Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs; and -- security arrangements should be agreed that permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement.

I have discussed this approach with the Secretary-General and with several Western European leaders. In the days ahead, the United States will consult along these lines with all interested parties. In the meantime, we urge the Secretary-General to continue his dedicated efforts.

#### Economic Development and Progress

The economic division of our planet between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, between the industrial and developing nations, is a dominant issue of our time. Our mutual dependence for our prosperity is a reality, not a slogan. It should summon our best efforts to make common progress. We must commit ourselves to bring mankind's dreams of a better life to closer reality in our lifetime.

There are many reasons why cooperation has not made greater strides:

-- The industrial democracies have sometimes been more willing to pay lip service to the challenge of development than to match rhetoric with real resources.

-- The oil-producing nations command great wealth, and some have been generous in their contribution to international development. But the overall performance in putting that wealth to positive uses has been inadequate to the challenge.

-- The countries with non-market economies are quite prepared to undertake verbal assaults, but their performance is in inverse ratio to their rhetoric. Their real contribution to development assistance has been minimal. Last year, for example, the non-market economies provided only about four percent of the public aid flowing to the developing nations.

-- The developing nations are understandably frustrated and impatient with poverty, illiteracy and disease. But too often they have made demands for change that are as confrontational as they are unrealistic. They sometimes speak of new economic orders as if growth were a quick fix requiring only that the world's wealth be properly redistributed through tests of strength instead of a process of self-help over generations. Ultimately, such tactics lose more than they gain, for they undermine the popular support in the industrial democracies which is imperative to provide the resources and market access -- available nowhere else -- to sustain development.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear; a rapid rise in the incomes of their people; a greater role in the international decisions which affect them; and fair access to the world's economic opportunities.

These goals are complementary; indeed they must be, for neither side can achieve its aims at the expense of the other. They can be realized only through cooperation.

We took a major step forward together a year ago, at the Seventh Special Session of this Assembly. And we have since followed through on many fronts.

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-- We have taken steps to protect the economic security of developing nations against cyclical financial disaster. The newly expanded compensatory finance facility of the International Monetary Fund has disbursed over \$2 billion to developing nations this year along.

-- An IMF Trust Fund financed by gold sales has been established for the benefit of the low-income countries.

-- Replenishments for the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank will provide additional resources for development.

-- Wordwide food aid has expanded. We have committed ourselves to expand the world supply of food. With a United States contribution of \$200 million, we have brought the International Fund for Agriculture Development close to operation.

-- The major industrial nations have moved to expand trade opportunities for the developing world. We have joined in a solemn pledge to complete by next year the liberalization of world trade through the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations. For its part, the United States has established a system of generalized preferences which has stimulated billions in exports from developing nations to the United States in 1975.

The United States continued this process by putting forward a number of new proposals at the Fourth Ministeral United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in May 1976. We proposed a comprehensive plan to improve the capacity of the developing countries to select, adapt, improve and manage technology for development. We committed ourselves to improvements in the quality of aid, proposing that a greater proportion of aid to poor countries be on a grant basis and united to purchases from donor nations. We agreed to a serious effort to improve markets of eighteen basic commodities.

These measures undertaken since we met here just a year ago assist -- not with rhetoric and promises, but in practical and concrete ways -- the peoples of the world who are struggling to throw off the chains of poverty.

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#### Much remains to be done:

First, the application of science and technology is at the very heart of the development process. The United States, conscious of its pioneering role in technology, has put forward three basic principles, which we will support with funds and talent:

-- to train individuals who can identify, select and manage the future technology of the developing world;

-- to build both national and international insitutions to create indigenous technology, as well as adapt foreign designs and inventions; and

-- to spur the private sector to make its maximum contribution to the development and transfer of technological progress.

To achieve these goals, we are today extending an invitation to the World Conference on Science and Technology for Development now scheduled for 1979 to meet in this country. In preparation for that meeting, we have asked members of the industrial, academic and professional scientific communities throughout the United States to meet in Washington in November. They will review the important initiatives this country can take to expand the technological base for development, and they will strive to develop new approaches.

Second, the Ministerial Meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris should be given new impetus. We are making several new proposals:

-- We will seek to help nations facing severe debt burdens. For acute cases we will propose guidelines for debt renegotiation. For countries facing longer-term problems, we will propose systematic examination of remedial measures, including increased aid.

-- We will advance new ideas for expanded cooperation in energy including a regular process of information exchange among energy producers and users, and an expanded transfer of energy-related technology to energy-poor developing nations.

Third, the industrial democracies have been far too willing to wait for the demands of the developing countries rather than to advance their own proposals. Now, however, the OECD countries, at the suggestion of the United States, have agreed to examine long-range development planning and to develop a more coherent and comprehensive approach to global growth and economic justice.

Fourth, natural disaster each year takes thousands of lives and costs billions of dollars. It strikes most those who can affort it the least -- the poorest peoples of the world. Its toll is magnified by a large array of global issues -- overpopulation, food scarcity, damage to the ecology, and economic underdevelopment. The United Nations has a unique capacity to address these global concerns and thus improve man's odds against nature. We urge this body to take the lead in strengthening international cooperation to prevent and alleviate natural calamity.

Our dream is that all the children of the world can live with hope and widening opportunity. No nation can accomplish this alone; no group of nations can achieve it through confrontation. But together there is a chance for major progress -- and in our generation.

#### Interdependence and Community

It is an irony of our time that an age of ideological and nationalistic rivalry has spawned as well a host of challenges that no nation can possibly solve by itself:

-- The proliferation of nuclear weapons capacilities adds a new dimension of danger to political conflicts, regionally and globally.

-- As technology opens up the oceans, conflicting national claims and interests threaten chaos.

-- Man's inventiveness has developed the horrible new tool of terror that claims innocent victims on every continent.

-- Human and civil rights are widely abused and have now become an accepted concern of the world community.

Let me set forth the United States' position on these topics.

The growing danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons raises stark questions about man's ability to ensure his very existence.

We have lived through three perilous decades in which the catastrophe of nuclear war has been avoided despite a strategic rivalry between a relatively few nations.

But now, a wholly new situation impends. Many nations have the potential to build nuclear weapons. If this potential were to materialize, threats to use nuclear weapons, fed by mutually reinforcing misconceptions, could become a recurrent feature of local conflicts in every quarter of the globe. And there will be growing dangers of accidents, blackmail, theft and nuclear terrorism.

Unless current trends are altered rapidly, the likelihood of nuclear devastation could grow steadily in the years to come.

We must look first to the roots of the problem:

-- Since the 1973 energy crisis and drastic rise in oil prices, both developed and developing nations have seen in nuclear energy a means both of lowering the cost of electricity and of reducing reliance upon imported petroleum.

-- In an age of growing nationalism some see the acquisition and expansion of nuclear power as symbols of enhanced national prestige. And it is also clear that some nations, in attaining this peaceful technology, may wish to provide for themselves a future option to acquire nuclear weapons.

A nation that acquires the potential for a nuclear weapons capability must accept the consequences of its action. It is bound to trigger offsetting actions by its neighbors and stimulate broader proliferation, thereby accelerating a process that ultimately will undermine its own security. And it is disingenuous to label as "peaceful" nuclear devices which palpably are capable of massive military destruction. The spread of nuclear reactor and fuel cycle capabilities, especially in the absence of evident economic need and combined with ambiguous political and military motives, threatens to proliferate nuclear weapons with all their dangers.

Time is of the essence. In no area of international concern does the future of this planet depend more directly upon what this generation elects to do -- or fails to do. We must move on three broad fronts:

First, international safeguards must be strengthened and strictly enforced. The supply and use of nuclear materials associated with civilian nuclear energy programs must be carefully safeguarded so that they will not be diverted. Nuclear suppliers must impose the utmost restraint upon themselves and not permit the temptations of commercial advantage to override the risks of proliferation. The physical security of nuclear materials -whether in use, storage or transfer -- must be increased. The International Atomic Energy Agency must receive the full support of all nations in making its safeguards effective, reliable and universally applicable. Any violator of the IAEA safeguards must face immediate and drastic penalties.

Second, adherence to safeguards, while of prime importance, is no guarantee against future proliferation. We must continue our efforts to forge international restraints against the acquisition or transfer of reprocessing facilities which produce separated plutonium and of enrichment facilities which produce highly enriched uranium -- both of which are useable for the construction of nuclear weapons.

Third, we must recognize that one of the principal incentives for seeking sensitive reprocessing and enrichment technology is the fear that essential non-sensitive materials, notably reactor-grade uranium fuel, will not be made available on a reliable basis. Nations that show their sense of international responsibility by accepting effective restraints have a right to expect reliable and economical supply of peaceful nuclear reactors and associated non-sensitive fuel. The United States, as a principal supplier of these items, is prepared to be responsible in this regard.

In the near future, President Ford will announce a comprehensive American program for international action on non-proliferation that reconciles global aspirations for assured nuclear supply with global requirements for nuclear control.

We continue to approach the proliferation problem in full recognition of the responsibility that we and other nuclear powers have -- both in limiting our weapons arsenals and in ensuring that the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy can be made available to all states within a shared framework of effective international safeguards. In this way, the atom can be seen once again as a boon and not a menace to mankind.

Another issue of vast global consequence is the Law of the Sea. The negotiations which have just recessed in New York represent one of the most important, complex and ambitious diplomatic undertakings in history. Consider what is at stake:

-- Mankind is attemtping to devise an international regime for nearly three quarters of the earth's surface.

-- Some 150 nations are participating, reflecting all the globe's diverse national perspective, ideologies, and practical concerns.

-- A broad sweep of vital issues is involved: economic development, military security, freedom of navigation, crucial and dwindling living resources, the ocean's fragile ecology, marine scientific research, and vast potential mineral wealth.

-- The world community is aspiring to shape major new international legal principles: the extension of the long-established territorial sea; the creation of a completely new concept of an economic zone extending two hundred miles; and the designation of the deep seabed as the "common heritage of mankind."

We have travelled an extraordinary distance in these negotiations in recent years -- thanks in no small part to the skill and dedication of the distinguished President of this Assembly. Agreement exists on key concepts: a twelve-mile territorial sea; free passage over and through straits; a two-hundred mile economic zone; and important pollution controls. In many fields, we have replaced ideological debates with serious efforts to find concrete solutions. And there is growing consensus that the outstanding problems must be solved at the next session.

But there is hardly room for complacency. Important issues remain which, if not settled, could cause us to forfeit all our hard-won progress. The Conference has yet to agree on the balance between coastal state and international rights in the economic zone; on the freedom of marine scientific research; on arrangements for dispute settlement; and, most crucially, on the regime for exploitation of the deep seabeds.

The United States has made major proposals to resolve the deep seabed issue. We have agreed that the seabeds are the common heritage of all mankind. We have proposed a dual system for the exploitation of seabed minerals by which half of the mining sites would be reserved for the international authority and half could be developed by individual nations and their nationals on the basis of their technical capacity. We have offered to find financing and to transfer the technology needed to make international mining a practical reality. And in light of the many un-

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certainties that lie ahead, we have proposed that there be a review -for example, in 25 years -- to determine whether the provisions on seabed mining are working equitably.

In response some nations have escalated both their demands and the stridency with which they advocate them.

I must say candidly that there are limits beyond which no American Administration can, or will, go. If attempts are made to compel concessions which exceed those limits, unilateralism will become inevitable. Countries which have no technological capacity for mining the seabeds in the foreseeable future should not seek to impose a doctrine of total internationalization on nations which alone have this capacity and which have voluntarily offered to share it. The United States has an interest in the progressive development of international law, stable order and global cooperation. We are prepared to make sacrifices for this -- but they cannot go beyond equitable bounds.

Let us therefore put aside delaying tactics and pressures and take the path of cooperation. If we have the vision to conclude a treaty considered fair and just by mankind, our labors will have profound meaning not only for the regimen of the oceans but for all efforts to build a peaceful, cooperative and prosperous international community. The United States will spend the interval between sessions of the Conference reviewing its positions and will approach other nations well in advance of the next session at the political level to establish the best possible conditions for its success.

A generation that dreams of world peace and economic progress is plagued by a new, brutal, cowardly and indiscriminate form of violence -- international terrorism. Small groups have rejected the norms of civilized behavior and wantonly taken the lives of defenseless men, women, and children -- innocent victims with no power to affect the course of events. In the year since I last addressed this body, there have been 11 hijackings, 19 kidhappings, 42 armed attacks and 112 bombings perpetrated by international terrorists. Over 70 people have lost their lives and over 200 have been injured.

It is time this Organization said to the world that the vicious murder and abuse of innocents cannot be absolved or excused by the invocation of lofty motives. Criminal acts against humanity, whatever the professed objective, cannot be excused by any civilized nation.

The threat of terrorism should be dealt with through the cooperative efforts of all countries. More stringent steps must be taken now to deny skyjackers and terrorists a safe haven.

Additonal measures are required to protect passengers in both transit and terminal areas, as well as in flight. The United States will work within the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to expand its present technical assistance to include the security of air carriers and terminal facilities. We urge the universal implementation of aviation security standards adopted by ICAO. We are prepared to assist the efforts of other governments to implement those standards.

The United States will support new initiatives which will ensure the safety of the innocent. The proposal of the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, against the taking of hostages, deserves the most serious and sympathetic consideration of this Assembly.

The United States will do everything within its power to work cooperatively in the United Nations and in other international bodies to put an end to the scourge of terrorism. But we have an obligation to protect the lives of our citizens as they travel at home or abroad, and we intend to meet that obligation. Therefore, if multilateral efforts are blocked by those determined to pursue their ends without regard for suffering or death, then the United States will act through its own legislative processes and in conjunction with others willing to join us.

Terrorism is an international problem. It is inconceivable that an organization of the world's nations would fail to take effective action against it.

The final measure of all we do together, of course, is man himself. Our common efforts to define, preserve and enhance respect for the rights of man thus represent an ultimate test of international cooperation.

We Americans, in the year of our Bicentennial, are conscious -- and proud -- of our own traditions. Our founders wrote 200 years ago of the equality and inalienable rights of all men. Since then the ideals of liberty and democracy have become the universal and indestructible goals of mankind.

But the plain truth -- of tragic proportions -- is that human rights are in jeopardy over most of the globe. Arbitrary arrest, denial of fundamental procedural rights, slave labor, stifling of freedom of religion, racial injustice, political repression, the use of torture, . and restraints on communications and expression -- these abuses are too prevalent.

The performance of the United Nations system in protecting human rights has fallen far short of what was envisaged when this organization was founded. The principles of the Universal Declaration are clear enough. But their invocation and application, in general debates of this body and in the forums of the Human Rights Commission, have been marred by hypocracy, double standards, and discrimination. Flagrant and consistent deprivation of human rights is no less heinous in one country or one social system than in another. Nor is it more acceptable when practiced

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upon members of the same race than when inflicted by one race upon another.

The international community has a unique role to play. The application of the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be entrusted to fair and capable international bodies. But at the same time let us ensure that these bodies do not become platforms from which nations which are the worst transgressors pass hypocritical judgment on the alleged shortcomings.

Let us together pursue practical approaches:

-- to build on the foundations already laid at previous assemblies and at the Human Rights Commission to lessen the abominable – practice of officially sanctioned torture.

-- to promote acceptance of procedures for protecting the rights of people subject to detention, such as access to courts, counsel, and families; prompt release or fair and public trial.

-- to improve the working procedures of international bodies concerned with human rights so that they may function fairly and effectively.

-- to strengthen the capability of the United Nations to meet the tragic problems of the ever growing number of refugees whose human rights have been stripped away by conflict in almost every continent.

The United States pledges its firm support to these efforts.

Conclusion

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished delegates:

The challenge to statesmanship in this generation is to advance from the management of crises to the building of a more stable and just international order -- an order resting not on power but on restraint of power, not on the strength of arms but on the strength of the human spirit.

Global forces of change now shape our future. Order will come in one of two ways: through its imposition by the strong and the ruthless or by the wise and farsighted use of international institutions through which we enlarge the sphere of common interests and enhance the sense of community.

It is easy and tempting to press relentlessly for national advantage. It is infinitely more difficult to act in recognition of the rights of others. Throughout history, the greatness of men and nations has been measured by their actions in times of acute peril. Today there is no single crisis to conquer. There is instead a persisting challenge of staggering complexity -- the need to create a universal community based on cooperation, peace and justice.

If we falter, future generations will pay for our failure. If we succeed, it will have been worth of the hopes of mankind. I am confident that we can succeed.

And it is here, in the assembly of nations, that we should begin.

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